MacGuigan,
J.A.
(orally):—We
do
not
need
to
hear
you,
Ms.
Brown.
Despite
the
cogent
and
able
argument
of
Mr.
Harris,
we
have
not
been
persuaded
that
the
Associate
Chief
Justice
made
any
relevant
error
of
law.
Admittedly,
he
was
obscure
in
his
statement
that
"the
vehicles
were
not
in
inventory”,
and
in
his
reference
to
the
purpose
of
the
statutory
provision,
but
he
had
an
unerring
instinct
for
the
notion
of
"held
for
sale”,
the
key
concept
in
paragraph
20(1)(gg)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"),
which
read
as
follows:
20(1)
Notwithstanding
paragraphs
18(1)(a),
(b)
and
(h),
in
computing
a
taxpayer's
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:.
.
.
(gg)
an
amount
in
respect
of
any
business
carried
on
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year,
equal
to
that
portion
of
three
per
cent
of
the
cost
amount
to
the
taxpayer,
at
the
commencement
of
the
year,
of
the
tangible
property
(other
than
real
property
or
an
interest
therein)
that
was
(i)
described
in
the
taxpayer's
inventory
in
respect
of
the
business,
and
(ii)
held
by
him
for
sale
or
for
the
purposes
of
being
processed,
fabricated,
manufactured,
incorporated
into,
attached
to,
or
otherwise
converted
into
or
used
in
the
packaging
of,
property
for
sale
in
the
ordinary
course
of
the
business
that
the
number
of
days
in
the
year
is
of
365;
The
appellant
contended
that"
held
for
sale"
must
be
taken
in
an
expanded
sense
so
that
it
was
not
related
to
any
given
point
of
time
in
the
two-to
three-
year
period
during
which
the
automobiles
were
leased
to
customers.
However,
in
our
view,
in
order
for
the
taxpayer
to
qualify
for
a
deduction
under
the
provisions,
they
had
to
be
held
for
sale
at
every
point
of
time
during
this
period,
which
was
clearly
not
the
case,
since
they
were
leased
to
customers
and
were
never
repossessed
for
sale
during
this
period.
Their
status
could
not
be
taken
as
mere
use
for
leasing
purposes;
it
was
a
contrary
use,
contrary
to
the
notion
of“
"held
for
sale”.
The
appellant's
alternative
argument,
that
the
phrase
"otherwise
converted"
should
be
taken
in
the
sense
of
changed
“in
function”
rather
than
"in
form",
does
not
appear
to
us
to
be
a
tenable
construction.
The
whole
list
of
alternatives
("processed,
fabricated,
manufactured,
incorporated
into,
attached
to.
.
.or
used
in
the
packaging
of")
has
reference
to
a
physical
change
in
form.
We
see
no
reason
to
come
to
any
different
conclusion
on
the
basis
of
any
part
of
the
French
text
of
the
provision.
It
represents
an
alternative
conceptualization
rather
than
a
literal
translation
of
the
English,
but
we
have
been
unable
to
detect
any
other
meaning
than
we
have
already
defined
for
the
English
version.
Since
the
phrase"
held
for
sale”
was
not
employed
elsewhere
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
at
the
relevant
time,
and
since
there
are
no
other
cases
on
point,
we
have
not
found
any
assistance
in
either
other
provisions
of
the
Act
or
the
jurisprudence.
The
appeal
must
therefore
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.
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