Date: 20260130

Docket: IMM-13521-24 Citation: 2026 FC 128

Ottawa, Ontario, January 30, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy

BETWEEN:

JAYA BISTA

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1] The Applicant, Jaya Bista, seeks this judicial review pursuant to s. 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA or Act], of a decision made by a visa officer to deny her the study permit she sought.

[2] The judicial review application is concerned with the justification for the decision rendered by a visa officer with respect to a denial of a student visa. As is now well known, a decision to be reasonable must not only reach an outcome that could be seen as reasonable, but the review court must also consider the reasoning process followed to reach a given decision. It is not for the reviewing court to decide issues. It cannot substitute itself for the administrative decision maker. A reviewing court is not a court of first review.

[3] The reviewing court will therefore consider the reasons given by the decision maker and assess whether there is a failure to the reasoning process or whether the decision is untenable in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints applicable in a given case (Vavilov v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, para 101). To reach a conclusion, the reviewing court will seek to develop an understanding of the reasons given such that an assessment of the reasonableness can be achieved. If a decision is reasonable, the reviewing court will owe it deference (Vavilov, para 85). The reviewing court will of course show restraint and adopt an appropriate posture of respect (Vavilov, para 13-14). But the reasons given will be used to determine if the decision is justified, transparent and intelligible, which are the hallmarks of a reasonable decision (Vavilov, para 99). The outcome will not suffice.

[4] Thus, reasons matter. In Vavilov, one reads paragraph 95:

[95] That being said, reviewing courts must keep in mind the principle that the exercise of public power must be justified, intelligible and transparent, not in the abstract, but to the individuals subject to it. It would therefore be unacceptable for an administrative decision maker to provide an affected party formal reasons that fail to justify its decision, but nevertheless expect that its decision would be upheld on the basis of internal records that were not available to that party.

I. The Facts

[5] The Applicant is a 46-year-old woman from Nepal. She currently lives in Nepal with her husband, her 15-year-old son, and her 5-year-old daughter.

[6] She holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Business Studies and a Master’s Degree in Business Administration obtained from Shankar Dev College, Tribhuvan University, in 2004.

[7] She pursued a two-year certification in hairdressing from 2008-2010 at the Victory Institute of Professional Training, Surry Hill, New South Wales, Australia. After the birth of her son, she pivoted back to work in business and since January 2014, she has been working in marketing at Snowman Winery Private Limited. In February 2022, she was promoted to Marketing Officer.

[8] On February 8, 2024, the Applicant received a Letter of Acceptance from Matrix College in Montreal for admission into its Digital Marketing Program, commencing on May 27, 2024. The Applicant applied in February 2024 for a “Certificat d’acceptation du Québec” (CAQ) for students from the Québec’s Ministry for Immigration, Francisation and Integration, which she received on March 22, 2024. It is valid for the period of May 1, 2024, to May 15, 2026.

[9] On April 26, 2024, the Applicant applied for a study permit to complete her two-year certificate (Attestation of College Studies) in Digital Marketing at Matrix College, in Montreal, which included a mandatory 450-hour French Language Program.

[10] On May 31, 2004, the Applicant’s study permit application was refused by a visa officer. This is the decision under review.

II. Decision under Review

[11] The Officer refused the Applicant’s study permit for the following reasons:

● I am not satisfied that you will leave Canada at the end of your stay as required by paragraph R216(1)(b) of the IRPR (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/ sor- 2002-227/section-216.html). I am refusing your application because you have not established that you will leave Canada, based on the following factors:

● The purpose of your visit to Canada is not consistent with a temporary stay given the details you have provided in your application.

[12] The Global Case Management System [GCMS] can provide the articulation of the reasons. The notes are part of the decision (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para 44); they are as follows in this case:

I have reviewed the application.

I have considered the following factors in my decision.

PA is 44 yrs ols, last completed studies are MBA In 2004 and has been working since last 20 years, intends to study cerficate course in business in Canada. Applicant has been unable to satisfactorily demonstrate how the intended program in Canada will build upon her previous education and experience and how it will support in her professional advancement. I am not satisfied with applicant’s purpose of travel, and that the applicant will successfully complete the intended program of studies and depart Canada at the end of their authorized stay.

Weighing the factors in this application, I am not satisfied that the applicant will depart Canada at the end of the period authorized for their stay.

For the reasons above, I have refused this application.

(transcribed as in the original)

III. Issues and Standard of Review

[13] The only issue raised in this judicial review was whether the decision of the officer to refuse the Applicant’s study permit satisfies the requirements of Vavilov.

[14] Both parties agree that the standard of review applicable to this issue is reasonableness. The Court agrees. The burden is on the Applicant to show that a decision is unreasonable (Vavilov at para 101). A reasonable decision “is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov, at para 85).

IV. Parties’ Submissions

A. The Applicant’s Submissions

[15] First, the Applicant submits that the visa officer misapprehended the evidence. The Applicant submits two examples of when the visa officer made a factual error. First, the officer concluded that the Applicant’s “last completed studies are MBA in 2004,” but the Applicant completed a certificate in hairdressing in 2010. The second example is that the officer concluded that the Applicant has been working for the last 20 years, when in fact the Applicant has only been working for the last 10.

[16] Second, the Applicant submits that the officer failed to find the nexus between the proposed course and the Applicant’s goals. The Applicant submits that the officer missed the evidence on the record wherein the Applicant demonstrated “how the intended program in Canada will build upon her previous education and experience and how it will support [her] professional development”, as demonstrated in her “Statement of Purpose”.

[17] Third, the Applicant submits that the officer’s decision is ultra vires. She argues that it is not clear what made the officer come to the conclusion that the Applicant will not successfully complete the intended program of studies. The Applicant relies on Patel v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 5 117, at paragraph 23-25, to support that “there is no reason to presume that immigration officers have expertise in assessing individuals’ prospects for success in a given academic program” (at para 24).

[18] It is also submitted that the officer missed evidence and improperly concluded that he was not satisfied that the Applicant will depart at the end of their authorized stay. The Applicant argues that the officer missed evidence, notably her travel history including that she stayed two years in Australia as a student, as well as her strong family ties including her husband, son, and daughter.

[19] Moreover, the officer gave no articulated reason to suggest that the Applicant would not leave Canada at the end of her stay. The officer ignored the fact that the Applicant was granted a scholarship of $18,000 by Matrix College, and there is no justification on the record for the officer to conclude that the Applicant would stay in Canada beyond her authorized stay.

[20] As well, in the Applicant’s Reply Memorandum of Fact and Law, the Applicant argues that the officer was biased and discriminated against the Applicant on the basis of her age. The Applicant submits that one does not simply stop learning at the age of 44. Further, the Applicant submits that the officer made an error when questioning why she would pursue a college degree after obtaining a Master’s degree. The Applicant states that there is nothing wrong in pursuing studies at a lower level after pursuing studies at a higher level.

B. The Respondent’s Submissions

[21] The Respondent explains that it was unclear to the officer why the applicant would choose this program in Canada as she: (1) is 44 years old; (2) obtained an MBA in 2004; (3) worked for the past 20 years; and (4) wasn't clear in the advantages that she would gain from the chosen program of study.

[22] Attention is drawn to the fact that the Applicant’s tuition fees, including room and board, will cost about $27,000, and in order to pay her expenses, her husband took a loan of $35,000 from the bank; he makes an annual salary of approximately $35,000.

[23] The Applicant’s employer did not seem aware of her plans to study in Canada. The Respondent argues that the Applicant’s plans to return to Nepal were not clear as she stated in her Statement of Purpose that she intends to start her own company following her studies. That illustrates that the two-year program in Digital Marketing does not prepare the Applicant for a specific position, hence the Officer's observation that the “Applicant has been unable to satisfactorily demonstrate how the intended program in Canada will build upon her previous education and experience and how it will support in her professional advancement”.

[24] The fact that the Applicant's purpose of visit is to complete a two-year program that would not give her any clear future plans, taken together with this significant costs of undertaking study in Canada, provided a rational basis for the Officer to be concerned that she would not leave Canada at the end of her authorized stay.

[25] It is submitted that the general principles apply: (1) the officer is presumed to have considered all of the evidence presented, unless the contrary is shown, and is not required to refer to each piece of evidence (citing Solopova v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 690 at para 28); and (2) that the officer has a wide discretion in assessing the evidence and coming to a decision on an application of this kind. The reasons were sufficient for the Applicant to understand why her application was rejected. In light of the evidence before the Officer, the Respondent submits that it was reasonable to find thpat the Applicant was not a bona fide student and rejected the application (citing Zhang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1493 at para 7).

V. Analysis

[26] What is defective in this case is the set of reasons given by the officer to deny the visa. I have reproduced at paragraph 12 the entirety of the reasons provided. In order to reach them, one has to delve into the GCMS, yet the reasons are in my view lacking. They lack intelligibility.

[27] I add that the reasons that are articulated by counsel cannot be a substitute for reasons given by the actual decision maker. The review court does not “fashion its own reasons in order to buttress the administrative decision” (Vavilov, para 96). The attempt by counsel to articulate that which was not articulated by the decision maker will also fall on deaf ears because that would equally “allow an administrative decision maker to abdicate its responsibility to justify to the affected party, in a manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis on which it arrived at a particular decision” (Vavilov, para 96).

[28] No one looks for perfection, or an examination proposition by proposition in eviscerating details. But reviewing courts are instructed not to fashion their own reasons when the reasons given do not pass muster: there cannot be fundamental gaps or an unreasonable chain of analysis to be supplemented by the court or by counsel. But there must be some articulation.

[29] Prior to Vavilov, I noted that arbitrariness is the antithesis of reasonableness (Aly Demyati v Canada (MCI), 2018 FC 701). Clearly the Supreme Court has since instructed reviewing courts to insist on reasons that allow for an understanding of the basis on which a decision is made.

[30] With all due respect, in the case at bar, the decision under review is just about devoid of any reasoning. The decision letter itself of May 31, 2024, is no more than a boilerplate instrument that does not go any further than stating that the officer is not satisfied that the requirements of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations have been met. Why and how they have not been met is left unsaid. Often the refusal letter is supplemented by the GCMS notes which serve as the backbone of the actual decision made, its articulation and justification.

[31] The difficulty here is that, contrary to the other cases, the notes in the Global Case Management System (GCMS) are less than enlightening. They are merely a recital of facts, without hardly anything more.

[32] The reasons do not need to be extensive, especially where the issue is a study visa. After all, the Supreme Court of Canada has twice found that “the most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter and remain in Canada” (Medovarski v Canada (MCI), 2005 SCC 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539, para 46; see also Canada (MEI) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at p. 733). As has been stated repeatedly, “reasonableness is a single standard that takes its colour from its context” (quoted at para 80, Vavilov). Surely, given the stakes, a reviewing court will not embark on an analysis imbued with anxious scrutiny like, perhaps, asylum cases. But the requirement that the reviewing court conduct reasonableness review remains, however limited it might be in visa refusal cases: “Instead, the reviewing court must consider only whether the decision made by the administrative decision maker - including both the rationale for the decision and the outcome to which it led - was unreasonable” (Vavilov, para 85). There is no requirement that the reviewing court be able to see the decision maker “watch me think”. But some minimum articulation must be present.

[33] In the case at bar, the decision maker lists factors and declares that the Applicant has been unable to demonstrate how the program will advance her career. Counsel for the respondent sought to articulate reasons that may explain why the refusal was reasonable. That may be true, but it is not for counsel for the Respondent to fill those gaps in the reasoning or for the Court to substitute its assessment of the case in the place of the decision maker. That is something a reviewing court is not entitled to do.

[34] The counsel for the Respondent made a valiant effort to explain what are the inferences that may have been made by the decision maker. The issue is that it is not for counsel to find dots and connect them, to make the connections between facts and possible inferences. The reviewing court may connect the dots as long as the lines and the direction they are headed may be readily drawn (Vavilov, para 97, referring to Komolafe v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431. The Court readily accepts that a visa officer has significant discretion in assessing the evidence and reaching a decision (Touri v Canada (MCI), 2020 FC 932, para 11). That said, that does not allow the decision maker to avoid the obligation to give reasons. Simply declaring that the decision maker is not satisfied the Applicant will leave the country falls short of the mark. The mark may be low in visa cases, but it exists. Counsel for the Respondent gamely seeks to fill the obvious gaps in the decision. Indeed, she goes outside the decision to identify other reasons to support the decision made. It is neither the role of counsel nor that of the Court to fill the obvious gaps in the “reasons”.

[35] I add that these cases pose the reviewing court a conundrum. Not only is there the fundamental requirement that the rule of law be preserved by ensuring that adequate, not perfect, reasons be given, but a reviewing court does not have to dispose of a moot case. In the case at bar, the applicant sought a visa in April 2024, for a program that was to start in May 2024. In and of itself, that situation ensured that the review of a refusal could only come months after the matter would have become moot. The Vavilov Court stated that “it will most often be appropriate to remit the matter to the decision maker to have it reconsider the decision, this time with the benefit of the court’s reasons” (para 141). Yet, there is a long line of cases which allows reviewing courts to decline to send cases back where “a particular outcome is inevitable and that remitting the case would therefore serve no useful purpose” (Vavilov, para 142).

[36] In a case like this one, there may be concerns as the case appears to be altogether moot. The controlling case on the doctrine of mootness remains Canada v Borowski, [1989] S.C.R. 34. In that case, the Court had to determine the parameters of the mootness doctrine. The doctrine applies “where the decision of the court will not have the effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties” (para 353 b). There is a need that remains a live controversy to be resolved. Has a tangible and concrete dispute disappeared? Have the issues become academic?

[37] Here, the applicant wished to be granted a study visa for a program to start more than 18 months ago. The question becomes, what remedy can the reviewing court grant?

[38] The mootness doctrine operates as a 2-step process. First, is the case moot? Second, if moot, should the Court entertain the matter? That second step involves at least three considerations. Do we still have a legal dispute which is based on the adversary system? How about the concern for judicial economy?

The concern for conserving traditional resources is partially answered in cases that have become moot if the court’s decision will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties notwithstanding that it will not have the effect of determining the controversy which gave rise to the application. The influence of this factor along with that of the first factor referred to above is evident in Vic Restaurant Inc. v City of Montreal, supra.

(p. 360 e)

Thirdly, the reviewing court must be aware that “Pronouncing judgments in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties may be viewed as intruding into the role of the legislative branch” (p. 362 e).

[39] Other than getting a visa, what other benefit could be drawn from the reviewing court deciding on the refusal of issuing a visa for reasons that do not meet the requirement for justification? What practical effect could the Court’s decision achieve? Can it be argued that this is a case that warrants, in spite of its mootness, consideration because of its recurring nature, but where the matter, when it reaches the reviewing court, will have reached the mootness level?

[40] In the case at hand, the Court enquired of the parties whether the case was moot in view of its resolution having no practical effect? The judicial review application merely asks for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, for the matter to be remitted for reconsideration by a different officer. But the question is, to be awarded what remedy?

[41] Given that the Applicant has not had an opportunity to consider more fully the issues, the Court chooses to grant the judicial review application, for the matter of mootness to be considered more fully in a future case. In the case at bar, it may be that the Applicant will find some usefulness to the exercise.

[42] As a result, to judicial review application must be granted. There are no serious questions of general importance that should be certified pursuant to S. 74 of the IRPA

 

THIS COURT’S ORDERS as follows:

1. The judicial review application is granted. The matter is remitted to another visa officer for the purpose of redetermination.

2. There is no serious question of general importance that should be certified.

Blank	“Yvan Roy”
Blank	Judge

 

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-13521-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	JAYA BISTA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	OTTAWA, ONTARIO
DATE(S) OF HEARING:	july 24, 2025 OCTOBER 8, 2025
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	ROY J.
DATED:	january 30, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Joseph Wilson	For The Applicant
Me Margarita Tzavelakos	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

CanImm-Solutions.ca LaSalle, Québec	For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada Montréal, Quebec	For The Respondent