Docket: IMM-24108-24
Citation: 2026 FC 225
Toronto, Ontario, February 18, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ferron
|
BETWEEN: |
|
THI HOAN MY PHAM
KHOA NAM NGUYEN
KHOA VIEN NGUYEN
KIM THIEN Y NGUYEN |
|
Applicants |
|
and |
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
|
Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] Ms. Thi Hoan My Pham [“Principal Applicant”
], is a citizen of Vietnam. Along with her three dependent children [collectively the “Applicants”
], she seeks the judicial review of a decision by a Canadian Immigration Officer made in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, dated December 16, 2024 [Decision], refusing her application for an Open Work Permit [“OPW”
] alongside study permits and a Temporary Resident Visa [“TRV”
] for her minor children [Dependents]. They were all intending to join the Principal Applicant’s spouse (and Dependents’ father), who currently works in Canada and is entitled to continue working in the country until June 2027.
[2] The Officer found that the Principal Applicant had failed to demonstrate that she would leave Canada at the end of her stay, as required by paragraph 200(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] for two reasons: 1) that her assets and unknown expected compensation are “insufficient to support the stated purpose of travel”
for herself as well as her Dependents and 2) her “significant family ties in Canada”
. For her teenage sons, Khoa Nam and Khoa Vien, the study permit applications were also dismissed based on the Officer’s conclusion that they had not proven they would leave Canada (as required by paragraph 216(1)b) of the IRPR) given their financial situation. The Officer also concluded that “the purpose of [their] visit is not consistent with a temporary stay”
in light of the details provided. Her youngest son, Kim Thien Y, who is around two and a half years old, had his temporary resident visa application refused on the same grounds.
[3] The Global Case Management System (GCMS) notes, which form part of the reasons for the Decision (El Hajj v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 2031 [El Hajj] at para 7, citing Mohammed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1933 [Mohammed] at para 9), specifically indicated that although the Principal Applicant gave evidence that she had some savings, she “deos not provide sufficient documentation of stable income to demosntrate provenance”
(sic). The Officer was therefore “not satisfied these funds will remain available”
. The Officer also noted that the income of her spouse, “will not cover LICO [low-income cut-off] for a family of 4.”
The Officer further noted that the Principal Applicant had “not provided documentation to demonstrate their employability in Canada”
and therefore was not satisfied that “they will be able to offset the costs”
of their stay. Weighing all these factors with the fact that the Applicants had “significant family ties in Canada”
, the Officer was not satisfied that the Applicants would depart Canada at the end of the period authorised for their stay. As for the Dependents, the Officer merely reasserted that their financial assets were “insufficient to support the stated purpose of travel”
and “[t]he purpose of the applicant’s visit to Canada is not consistent with a temporary stay given the details provided”
.
[4] The Applicants first argue that the Decision is unreasonable because the Officer erred in law “as they misapplied the Regulations and accompanying policy and Operational Instructions under IRPR and imported in criteria that were not part of the requirements”
for an OWP pursuant to subparagraph 205(c)(ii) of the IRPR. They claim that it was not a requirement for the Principal Applicant to prove her employability in Canada or her ability to meet the LICO for the entire family. The Applicants also submit that the Officer ignored the bank statements and proof of property ownership that showed the Applicants had sufficient savings and assets to support themselves, as well as strong ties to Vietnam, rendering a return to their home country probable.
[5] This application for judicial review will be denied. The Decision is reasonable.
II. Standard of review
[6] The Court agrees with the parties that the appropriate standard of review that applies to the merits of administrative decisions, such as those regarding OWPs, study permits, and TRVs, is reasonableness, the whole in accordance with the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] (see also Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [Mason]; Mohammed at paras 14-17; Zamor v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 479 [Zamor] at para 19). The recognized exceptions to this presumption do not apply in the present matter (Canadian Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at paras 27-28).
[7] As stated by Justice Gascon in Mohammed (previously cited):
[14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Pepa at para 46; Mason at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” (Vavilov at para 99, citing notably Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).
[15] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Pepa at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” (Vavilov at para 13).
[16] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence (Mason at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker (Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; Doyle v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237 at para 3).
[17] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” (Vavilov at para 100).
[8] Given that visa Officers have recognized expertise in analyzing and assessing temporary resident visa applications, courts must give considerable deference to these decision makers when reviewing their discretionary decisions, especially since such decisions usually turn on questions of fact (Zamor at para 19 citing Solopova v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 690 [Solopova] at para 12).
[9] As Justice Pamel stated in Touré v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 932 at para 11:
Moreover, the officer has wide discretion in assessing the evidence and coming to a decision (Zhang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1493 at para 7; (Solopova v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 690 at para 22 [Solopova] at para 11). The officer’s duty to provide reasons for the decision is minimal (Solopova at para 32). The decision maker is assumed to have weighed and considered all the evidence presented to him unless the contrary is shown (Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (FCA), [1993] FCJ No. 598 at para 1).
[10] Although the duty to provide reasons when evaluating temporary resident visa applications, including those concerning work and study permits, is minimal, officers must still provide adequate reasons so their decisions are transparent, justified and intelligible (El Hajj at para 16, Ghodsi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 620 at para 7; Mittal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 811 [Mittal] at para 12; Chera v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 733 [Chera] at para 36 citing Sopolova at para 32 and He v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1027 at paras 18-20; Wang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 985 [Wang] at para 32).
III. The Decision is reasonable
[11] As Justice Lagacé stated in Obeng v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 754 [Obeng] at paragraph 20, “there is a legal presumption that a foreign national seeking to enter Canada is presumed to be an immigrant, and it is up to him to rebut this presumption”
. In addition to the eligibility requirements mentioned in the IRCC’s Operational Instructions for OWP, the Applicants were still required to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they would leave Canada by the end of the period authorized (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] at s 20(1)b); see also paragraph 200(1)b) of the IRPR for work permits, subsection 179(b) of the IRPR for TRVs and paragraph 216(1)b) of the IRPR for study permits; Gonzalez Zuluaga v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1105 [Zuluaga] at para 10; Solopova at para 22). The Officer determined that the Applicants failed to do so.
[12] In the present matter, the Officer considered the evidence filed by the Applicants in support of their joint applications. While the Officer noted the Applicants’ evidence regarding their savings, the Officer found it insufficient to establish source and stability. Combined with the spouse’s low income, and the absence of proof of employability for the Principal Applicant, the Officer found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that 1) the Applicants had the financial means to support the costs of a family of five during their stay in Canada, and 2) they would leave Canada at the end of the period authorized for their stay. The Officer also considered the fact that the Applicants’ whole immediate family would be in Canada as amounting to “significant family ties in Canada”
.
A. The officer did not err in law
[13] As concerns the applicable law, the Applicants submit that the requirements for OWP “only require that the principal foreign national, in this case Tran Trieu Nguyen [the Principal Applicant’s spouse], be employed in a TEER 4 or 5 application, not based on a low wage LMIA [Labor Market Impact Assessment], and that his work permit expires more than 6 months after the work permit application.”
Is it not disputed that these requirements were met.
[14] While it is true that the IRPR, and accompanying policy and Operational Instructions under IRPR, do not explicitly provide that family members must prove their employability and financial resources when they seek to join the holder of a work permit who is already in Canada, it was not unreasonable for the Officer to consider these factors in the context of establishing if the Applicants had sufficient financial means to support a family of five during their stay, as well as to determine if the Applicants would leave the country at the end of their authorized stay. Operational guidelines and other administrative policies do not tie an officer’s hands (Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at paras 53-55; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Kassab, 2020 FCA 10 at para 42).
[15] By noting that the Applicants did not demonstrate that they would have sufficient financial resources to sustain themselves in Canada, and that there was no proof that the Principal Applicant was employable here, the Officer did not import additional criteria into the applicable legal framework. They merely engaged in a logical assessment of the evidence, to determine if the requested stay was sustainable and whether the Applicants were likely to leave the country when legally required to. They looked at the Principal Applicant’s own resources and employability only after meaningfully addressing her spouse’s income, which they found to be insufficient to support the whole family.
[16] The Applicants also take issue with the Officer’s reference to the LICO for Ontario, where the family is to reside, alleging it amounts to the imposition of another criterion absent from the applicable legislation and ministerial guidelines. This argument is also bound to fail. The LICO was only used as an objective point of reference (the Officer makes reference to the cost of living for family of 4), to assess the family’s ability to support itself, and the Federal Court has upheld decisions in which officers used LICO to assess a family’s ability to sustain itself in the past (see for example Malit v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 16, at para 3 and 16; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 808 at paras 14, 19-21).
[17] As explained above, all foreigners seeking entry to Canada must prove that they intend to leave the country when legally required to do so. When upholding a visa officer’s decision to deny the principal applicant’s OPW application alongside the applications of her spouse and Dependents for work and study permits in Vergel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 873 [Vergel], this Court unambiguously stated that “[e]vidence of personal assets and financial status are appropriate factors to consider when assessing whether an applicant will leave Canada at the end of their stay”
(at para 13 citing Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1107 at para 17).
[18] It was therefore reasonable for the Officer to do the same in the present matter.
B. The alleged lack of engagement with the factual record
[19] This Court’s jurisprudence is clear that decision-makers are presumed to have considered all of the evidence before them (El Hajj at para 33, citing Chatrath v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 958 at para 35; Solopova at para 28; Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC) [Cepeda-Gutierrez] at para 17). However, “the more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analysed in the agency’s reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact “without regard to the evidence” (…) Thus, a blanket statement that the agency has considered all evidence will not suffice when the evidence submitted from any discussion in the reasons appears squarely to contradict the agency’s finding of fact”
(Cepeda-Gutierrez at para17; Aghaalikhani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1080 at para 24; Adu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1363 at para 22). This is what the Applicants submit occurred in the present matter.
[20] First, the Applicants submit that the Officer disregarded some of the evidence related to the Principal Applicant’s savings. That is not the case here. On the contrary, the Officer expressly refers to this evidence but finds that the Applicants did not “provide sufficient documentation of stable income to demosntrate provenance”
(sic). The jurisprudence of this Court clearly states that, when assessing a study permit application, officers “must not only look at an applicant’s bank account, but also conduct a more detailed and fulsome analysis about the source, origin, nature, and stability of these funds to determine if the applicant is able to defray the cost of their stay in Canada”
(Aghvamiamoli v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1613 at para 29). This is also true in the context of spousal OPW applications and TRVs (Baring v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1668 at paras 29, 34; Bawa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1605 at para 7). Therefore, it was open to the Officer to conclude that evidence was lacking as regards source and stability of funds. Nothing in the evidence provided directly contradicted the Officer’s finding that there was no proof of a stable income.
[21] Given the evidence that the Principal Applicant owns a restaurant in Vietnam and her claims that she is self-employed and works at this restaurant, the Applicants suggest that the Officer should have inferred that the Principal Applicant’s savings came from the restaurant she operates. While the Court concedes that the Officer’s findings of insufficient evidence regarding the source of the Principal Applicant’s savings could have benefited from a more detailed reasoning, this is not enough to infer that the Officer failed to consider the evidence. It was open to the Officer to find that this evidence was insufficient given that there were no bank records or other documents linking the restaurant to the savings. In view of the above, it was open to the Officer to conclude that the Applicants did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the family had enough resources to support itself.
[22] The Applicants also submit that the Officer erred with respect to the Applicants’ financial and personal ties to Vietnam by ignoring evidence related to the assets located in Vietnam that the Principal Applicant owns (a plot of land with no estimated value and a restaurant with limited business capital value), as well as the fact that the Principal Applicant’s parents still live in the country.
[23] The Respondent suggest that “while family ties are mentioned in the refusal letter, it is apparent from the GCMS notes that family ties were not central to the decision”
and that “the main reason for refusal was the insufficiency of (…) assets and financial support that demonstrated the Applicant and children would leave at the end of their stay in Canada”
. The Respondent further submits that “if an error has been made with respect to family ties, it does not vitiate the decision”
(citing Nahvi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 2076 at para 5; Rezaali v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 269 at paras 24-25; Ocran v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 175 at para 48).
[24] Although the Applicants are correct that the Decision does not appropriately assess their family ties with Vietnam, the Court agrees with the Respondent that this error is not sufficient to warrant overturning the Decision as a whole. When considered holistically, it is evident that the issue of family ties was a not central to the Decision.
[25] For the above reasons, the application for judicial review is denied.
Email this Content