Date: 20260320

Docket: IMM-346-25

Citation: 2026 FC 376

Toronto, Ontario, March 20, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicants, Daniel Eduardo Quintana Caceres [Principal Applicant or PA], his spouse, Paola Simone Rodriguez Ramirez [Associate Applicant or AA], and their two minor children, are citizens of Venezuela and Colombia. They report a fear of persecution in Colombia because of the PA’s refusal to cooperate with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación National) [ELN], an insurgent paramilitary group operating in Colombia and Venezuela.

[2] The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] refused the Applicants’ claim on December 17, 2024, finding that the Applicants were neither Convention refugees, nor persons in need of protection. The determinative issue was the availability of an internal flight alternative [IFA] in Barranquilla, Colombia.

[3] The Applicants seek judicial review of the RPD’s decision under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], arguing that the RPD’s analysis under the first prong of the IFA test is unreasonable.

[4] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review will be dismissed.

II. Background

[5] In 2019, the Applicants resided in Venezuela. The PA and AA were active members of an opposition political party in Venezuela, and the PA participated in meetings, marches, and the distribution of humanitarian aid. The PA reports that he was threatened and assaulted on several occasions due to his political opinion and activism, which led the Applicants to relocate to Colombia in December 2019.

[6] In Colombia, the PA began working for a mining company in Cúcuta. The PA reports that, in March 2023, a member of the ELN attended his work and demanded that he steal some carbon for the organization. The member of the ELN then reportedly returned to the PA’s workplace on April 29, 2023, and threatened to kill the Applicants if the PA did not comply.

[7] The Applicants left Colombia in May 2023, first travelling to the United States before entering Canada in July 2023 and seeking refugee protection under an exception to the Safe Third Country Agreement. As noted above, the RPD found the Applicants have a viable IFA in Colombia. It is that decision that is under review as the Applicants do not have the right, pursuant to paragraph 110(2)(d) of the IRPA, to appeal the RPD decision to the Refugee Appeal Division.

III. Decision Under Review

[8] In finding that the availability of a viable IFA in Barranquilla was determinative of the Applicants’ claim, the RPD first noted that Barranquilla was the fourth most populated city in Colombia and located approximately 800 kilometres from where the Applicants lived, and the PA worked, in Colombia until May 2023.

[9] The RPD then set out and applied the two-pronged test for determining the viability of an IFA – (i) there is no serious possibility of the claimants being persecuted or subjected, on a balance of probabilities, to a danger of torture or to a risk to their lives or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the proposed IFA area, and (ii) conditions in the IFA area must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimants, for the claimants to seek refuge there (Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1991 CanLII 13517 (FCA) at 709–710, [1992] 1 FC 706).

[10] In concluding the Applicants would be able to relocate to Barranquilla, the RPD considered the following: (1) the PA had testified that his last interaction with the ELN was on April 29, 2023; (2) the Applicants had not alleged that their family in Colombia, including the AA’s mother who lived in Cúcuta until December 2023 and the PA’s brother in Medellín, had been contacted by the ELN; (3) the National Documentation Package on Colombia indicates that the ELN is more likely to track high-profile individuals or active advocates, such as human rights defenders, journalists, governments, and the PA does not fit any of these profiles.

[11] The RPD found that the ELN had the means to locate the Applicants. However, the RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, that the ELN had “little interest” in the Applicants and that the Applicants had failed to establish with sufficient evidence that the ELN had the motivation to pursue them to Barranquilla.

[12] On the second prong of the IFA test, the RPD considered the PA’s and AA’s education and work experience and found that it was not objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh for the Applicants to relocate to Barranquilla.

IV. Issues and Standard of Review

[13] The Applicants take no issue with the RPD’s analysis and findings under the second prong of the IFA test but submit the RPD erred in its consideration of the first prong. The application raises a single issue that I have divided into three sub-issues:

1. Did the RPD err in concluding the ELN lacked the motivation to locate the Applicants in the IFA because:

1. The motivation assessment was cursory and incomplete;

2. The RPD failed to consider the Applicants’ country condition evidence; and

3. The RPD relied on the absence of ELN contact with family members to support its motivation finding.

[14] The Parties submit, and I agree, that the RPD’s treatment of the first prong of the IFA test is reviewable on the presumptive standard of reasonableness. A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [Vavilov]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 8 [Mason]).

[15] The party challenging a decision has the burden of demonstrating to a reviewing court “sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that the decision cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” (Vavilov at para 100, Mason at paras 59–61).

V. Analysis

[16] Where an IFA is proposed, it is a claimant’s burden to demonstrate, under the first prong of the test, that the IFA is unreasonable due to the possibility of persecution within the proposed IFA from the identified agent or agents of persecution. The assessment under the first prong of the test considers whether an identified agent of persecution has both the means and the motivation to harm the claimant in the IFA (Akingbade v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 606 at para 13 [Akingbade], citing Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1080 at para 17).

[17] Motivation findings are fact-specific and may involve the consideration of a variety of factors including “the identity and the nature of the agent of persecution; the reason the claimants were initially targeted; the steps the agents of persecution have taken; the length of time that has passed without contact; and the relationship the agents of persecution have to the applicants” (Akingbade at para 14, citing Canifru Candia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 917 at para 19 [Candia]).

A. The RPD’s motivation finding is reasonable

(1) The RPD’s assessment is neither cursory nor incomplete

[18] The Applicants submit that the RPD’s motivation analysis is cursory because the RPD did not consider (1) the persecution the Applicants had faced in Venezuela, (2) the PA’s political activities in Venezuela, and (3) the PA’s profile as a manager, as opposed to an employee, of a mining company.

[19] I find little merit in any of these arguments.

[20] As I understand the Applicants’ position, they rely on the country condition documentation that indicates the ELN operates in both Colombia and Venezuela in advancing the argument that the RPD was required to consider the risk in the IFA resulting from the PA’s activities in Venezuela. I disagree.

[21] The PA’s Basis of Claim [BOC] form reports that he is at risk in Venezuela and Colombia. The BOC states that in Venezuela the PA is “threatened by the government of Venezuela and their armed colectivos” and that the PA fears “the ELN in Colombia.” This is accurately reflected in the RPD’s decision and there is nothing in the record that suggests the ELN’s reported interest in the PA arises from any of his activities in Venezuela. The RPD states that the PA testified that the ELN would be interested in finding him because he did not comply with their orders, a statement that is not disputed by the Applicants and is consistent with the BOC. The BOC in turn discloses that the only ELN orders reported are those that relate to the PA’s role as a mine manager in Colombia.

[22] The PA having not reported that the ELN would be motivated to seek him out in the IFA as a result of his activities in Venezuela, the RPD was under no obligation to consider that possibility.

[23] With respect to the PA’s political activities in Venezuela, the RPD – having concluded the Applicants have an IFA in Colombia – was not required to engage in an assessment of a claim for protection in relation to Venezuela (Martinez Cabrales v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1178 at para 53; Kazeem v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 185 at para 25).

[24] Turning to the argument that the RPD failed to consider the PA’s profile as a mine manager, I acknowledge that the RPD does refer to the PA as “an employee at a mining company who refused to help the ELN steal carbon from the company,” as opposed to a manager. However, the Applicants have not identified any evidence that indicates managers or those in more senior positions at a mining company are more likely to be targeted by the ELN than other mine employees. Nor have the Applicants established that the RPD’s assessment of the PA’s profile, whether as a manager or an employee at a mining company, undermines the reasonableness of its IFA findings. I therefore see no error.

(2) The RPD was under no obligation to specifically reference the Applicants’ country condition evidence

[25] In support of their claim, the Applicants presented documentary evidence, including five news articles, published between January 2023 and April 2024 regarding the ELN’s activities in Colombia and Venezuela. The documentary evidence discloses that the ELN has targeted coal miners in Colombia, that the threats posed by the ELN were escalating, and that the ELN engages in illegal mining activities in both Venezuela and Colombia. The Applicants submit the RPD overlooked or ignored this evidence and that it demonstrates the ELN’s motivation to locate the Applicants within the IFA. Again, I disagree.

[26] The evidence in issue does demonstrate a potential ELN interest in mine employees in certain regions of Colombia, including the region where the Applicants lived until they left Colombia in May 2023. However, it does not disclose an active ELN presence within the proposed IFA and as such is not inconsistent with the RPD’s motivation finding.

[27] Nor was the RPD required to address this evidence. Administrative decision-makers benefit from the presumption that all the evidence before them has been weighed and considered. In addition, the RPD was under no obligation to specifically address documentary evidence that was not inconsistent with the conclusions reached. The RPD’s failure to expressly address the Applicants’ documentary evidence does not warrant the Court’s intervention.

[28] For the same reasons, the RPD did not err in failing to engage with the evidence indicating the ELN operates in both Colombia and Venezuela.

(3) The RPD did not err by relying on the absence of ELN contact with family members to support its motivation finding

[29] Relying on Candia, the Applicants argue that the RPD’s motivation finding is unreasonable because the RPD considered the fact that there was no evidence indicating the Applicants’ family members in Colombia had been approached by the ELN.

[30] In Candia, Justice Lobat Sadrehashemi concludes the RAD erred because it relied on the “general assertion that ‘a lack of attempts to locate the Appellants is usually a good indicator of the lack of motivation of the agent of harm’” (at para 21). She also notes that motivation findings are fact- and context-specific (at para 19).

[31] Candia is distinguishable on the facts. In this case, the RPD did not exclusively rely on the absence of ELN contact with family members but rather considered this factor in conjunction with a variety of others including: the identity and nature of the ELN; the nature of the threats; the length of time that had passed without ELN contact with the PA; and that the PA did not share the profile of those typically targeted by the ELN.

[32] In addition, the PA testified that the ELN had threatened to harm him and his family if he did not cooperate with their demands. This circumstance further indicates it was not unreasonable for the RPD to consider the absence of ELN contact with family members as part of the constellation of circumstances underpinning the finding that motivation had not been established.

VI. Conclusion

[33] The application for judicial review is dismissed.

[34] Neither Party has proposed a question of general importance for certification, and I agree that none arise.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-346-25

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. This application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. No question is certified.

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: