JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicant, Mr. Kohli, is challenging the decision of an officer at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (“the Officer”) to refuse his application to restore his temporary resident status. The Officer found that Mr. Kohli could not use the restoration process to be restored to the status of worker, an authorization he was seeking to obtain and not the one he had previously held. Mr. Kohli argues the Officer’s interpretation of subsection 182(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] is inconsistent with jurisprudence of this Court and is therefore unreasonable. He also argues that the decision was unreasonable because the Officer failed to consider the evidence and submissions before them. Lastly, Mr. Kohli asserts the process was unfair because he was not notified of the Officer’s concern about his eligibility.

[2] I am not satisfied that Mr. Kohli has raised a reviewable error with the Officer’s decision. The jurisprudence Mr. Kohli raises about subsection 182(1) relate to different circumstances and, without more, are not a sufficient basis to find the Officer’s interpretation of the provision as unreasonable. I also do not find Mr. Kohli has raised a basis for the Court’s intervention in relation to the Officer’s assessment of the evidence and submissions, or with respect to the notice he was provided. Accordingly, I dismiss the application for judicial review.

II. Procedural History

[3] The Applicant is a citizen of India who arrived in Canada in August 2018 on a study permit. There is a dispute as to whether the Applicant was out of status at the time that he filed his application for a work permit. The officer determining the work permit application found he applied for the work permit a day after his study permit expired on June 1, 2022 and therefore was out of status and not eligible for the LMIA-based work permit; Mr. Kohli maintains he applied for the work permit on the day the study permit expired. Mr. Kohli did not, however, challenge the work permit refusal.

[4] Instead, he applied for an application to restore his temporary status. Mr. Kohli asked to restore his authorization to that of a worker, the authorization he was seeking, and not that of a student, the authorization he previously held. On May 13, 2023, the Officer refused the application, finding that: “As per the processing guidelines clients must be restored onto the document they held previously. As the client previously held a study permit, they cannot be restored onto a work permit.”

III. Issues and Standard of Review

[5] Mr. Kohli is challenging the merits of the Officer’s decision. The parties agree, as do I, that I ought to review the substance of the decision on a reasonableness standard (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at para 23).

[6] In Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada described the reasonableness standard as a deferential but nonetheless “robust form of review”, where the starting point of the analysis begins with the decision maker’s reasons (at para 13). A decision maker’s formal reasons are assessed “in light of the record and with due sensitivity to the administrative regime in which they were given” (Vavilov at para 103). The Court described a reasonable decision as “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov at para 85). Administrative decision makers, in exercising public power, must ensure that their decisions are “justified, intelligible and transparent, not in the abstract, but to the individuals subject to it” (Vavilov at para 95).

[7] Mr. Kohli also raises a procedural fairness issue relating to notice. I will consider whether the notice provided was fair in all the circumstances (Vavilov at paras 23, 77; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54).

IV. Analysis

A. Interpretation of Subsection 182(1) of IRPR

[8] Mr. Kohli argues that the Officer ought to have considered restoring him to the worker authorization, though he had not previously held a work permit, because it was the authorization he was seeking to obtain. Mr. Kohli’s arguments turn on the interpretation of subsection 182(1) of IRPR:

[9] The Officer interpreted subsection 182(1) of the IRPR to mean that an applicant could only restore to the authorization held t immediately prior to restoration application and not one an applicant has not yet held. It is understandable that the Officer applied this interpretation because it follows the instructions in the IRCC’s internal guidelines and the publicly posted guidelines:

If a temporary resident has lost their status (section 47 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA]) or let their authorization to work or study expire, they may apply to restore that status in accordance with section 182 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR). It is important to note that since status and authorization are not the same under the IRPA, an applicant can only restore their status to that of a temporary resident and to the authorization that they held immediately prior to the restoration application.

As an example, a student who lost their status cannot apply to restore temporary resident status with authorization to work. A temporary resident who held a study permit and has lost their status can apply in Canada for restoration of their temporary resident status and study permit. They may also apply and pay for a work permit if they meet the requirements of the work permit program they are applying for. If they are approved for the study permit, the work permit application will then be processed.

[10] These guidelines are consistent with the information available on the public-facing page on restoration of status:

If you want to change your permit and restore your status If your permit and status have expired, you must restore your initial permit and status first. After that, you can apply for a different permit.

[11] Administrative policy does not, however, end the inquiry as to whether the contested provision is consistent with the modern principle of statutory interpretation (Zeifmans LLP v Canada, 2022 FCA 160 at para 12; Stemijon Investments Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 299 at para 60). It does, however, provide some “evidence of general practice and context which can be used in statutory interpretation” (Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 [Pepa] at para 110). Administrative decision-makers are required, no matter the interpretative exercise they use, to interpret legislation in a way that is consistent with its text, context and purpose (Vavilov at para 118).

[12] Mr. Kohli’s position is that the guidance the Officer followed is inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence. In particular, he relies heavily on a decision from 2018: Udobong v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 234 [Udobong].

[13] In Udobong, the Court ultimately found that because the applicants had applied to restore their status as visitors but really had an intention to study, it was reasonable for the officer to refuse the restoration of the visitor application because they did not meet the “initial requirements of their stay as temporary visitors.” In the course of its decision, the Court seems to suggest, arguably in obiter because it was not the basis on which it determined the case, that the applicants may have been able to seek restoration into the authorization they were seeking to obtain – a study permit (Udobong at para 24). For this proposition, the Court relied on a statement in on Abubacker v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1112 [Abubacker]. In Abubacker, the Court specifically referenced the Program Delivery Instructions in place at the time (2014) for the Post Graduate Work Permit [PGWP] program which the Court also found were binding on PGWP eligibility determinations:

The parties agreed and I accept that the Restoration PDI [Program Delivery Instructions] provides that the phrase “meets the initial requirements for their stay” in subsection 182(1) of the IRPR can be interpreted so that a student in the applicant’s situation whose study permit has expired and who needs a PGWP is required to show that he or she meets the requirements for a PGWP and not those for a study permit. As well, the Restoration PDI indicates that in the applicant’s situation, paragraph 179(d) of the IRPR means that the applicant must show that he meets the requirements for a PGWP.

[14] Mr. Kohli was not applying for a PGWP. The PGWP is a specific program that “stems from the authority provided to the Minister to create programs allowing foreign nationals to receive work permits where the Minister deems it necessary for reasons of public policy” (Odeseye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 93 at para 7). The very purpose of the program is to facilitate a transition from study in Canada into the workforce in particular circumstances. The binding Program Delivery Instructions do not apply to Mr. Kohli’s circumstances.

[15] Further, in Abubacker and Udobong, the applicants had filed a restoration application for the authorization they had held immediately prior to applying. The key issue in this judicial review was therefore not an issue in those cases.

[16] Mr. Kohli has not explained, in light of the significant differences in these cases, why these are relevant precedents for establishing that the Officer’s interpretation is inconsistent with this Court’s jurisprudence (Pepa at para 85). I further note, albeit in the context of the PGWP program, there are two recent decisions of my colleagues that found it reasonable to require applicants to apply for restoration into the authorization they held immediately prior to their restoration application (Kaur v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1311 at para 16 and Kaur v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 173 at para 11).

[17] It may be that there is an argument to be made about whether the IRCC’s guidelines requiring restoration into the most immediate authorization is inconsistent with the text, context and purpose of subsection 182(1) of IRPR. However, based on the arguments before me, which were limited to a reliance on the alleged inconsistency of the Officer’s decision with Udobong, I cannot find that there is a basis to overturn the Officer’s interpretation. The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that the interpretation is unreasonable (Vavilov at para 100).

B. Review of the Evidence and Submissions

[18] Mr. Kohli argues that the Officer failed to consider highly material evidence that contradicted their conclusion. Mr. Kohli does not point to any evidence on the record which the Officer ignored, or which they ought to have, and failed, to consider.

[19] Mr. Kohli argues that “[t]he finding of no legal status is unreasonable as the Applicant submitted sufficient evidence to prove the genuineness of the application and was well within the timelines of restoration.”

[20] To the extent that Mr. Kohli challenges the decision denying him the LMIA-based work permit he applied for, apparently refused because he lacked “legal status,” that is a different decision than the one under review in this application. Further, as explained above, the restoration application was not refused because Mr. Kohli was out of time; rather, the Officer found that the nature of the temporary visa once held by Mr. Kohli, a study permit, is different than the work permit he sought – therefore, he could not be “restored” on a document he had not previously held. Lastly, the Officer made no comments on the genuineness of his application to restore his temporary status.

C. Procedural Fairness

[21] Mr. Kohli argues that he was owed a procedural fairness letter to alert him to the Officer’s concerns with his application. I disagree.

[22] As set out above, the public guidance on restoration explicitly addresses the basis for the Officer’s refusal. This guidance explains the nature of the restoration application required in the Applicant’s circumstances. There is nothing in the Officer’s reasons or in the record that suggests any issue arose which required that Mr. Kohli be afforded an opportunity to respond.

D. Disposition

[23] Based on the reasons above, I am not satisfied that there is a basis for the Court to interfere with the Officer’s decision on Mr. Kohli’s restoration application. The application for judicial review is dismissed. Neither party raised a question for certification and I agree none arises.

JUDMENT IN IMM-6733-23

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed; and
2. No serious question of general importance is certified.

FEDERAL COURT

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