Docket: IMM-24425-24
Citation: 2026 FC 417
Toronto, Ontario, March 31, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice A. Grant
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BETWEEN: |
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LOGAN SOMERS-EDGAR
STEPHANIE NOEL PINK
GRANT SOMERS-EDGAR
JANICE MARY SOMERS-EDGAR |
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Applicants |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. OVERVIEW
[1] The Applicants seek judicial review of a decision by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] to refuse their application for permanent residence under the parents and grandparents program.
II. BACKGROUND
[2] Grant Somers-Edgar and Janice Mary Somers-Edgar, are citizens of New Zealand. On October 12, 2023, IRCC invited their son, Logan Somers-Edgar, to apply to sponsor Grant and Janice to become permanent residents of Canada.
[3] Grant and Janice submitted their application for permanent residence on October 24, 2023.
[4] On May 31, 2024, Logan received a procedural fairness letter indicating that the application was missing various materials. Logan responded on June 3, 2024, providing IRCC with the documents that he understood to be missing.
[5] On July 17, 2024, Logan received a second letter from IRCC stating that a document was still missing from the application of Grant Somers-Edgar, as follows:
Proof of Relationship to Principal Applicant: The proof of relationship between the Dependant and Principal Applicant has not been provided. Please provide a proof of relationship for the Dependant’s relationship to the Principal Applicant.
[6] The letter went on to specify:
• If the dependant is married to or in a common-law relationship with the Principal Applicant, please provide a marriage certificate or Statutory Declaration of Common-Law Union (IMM 5409) for the Principal Applicant and Dependent Spouse/Common-law partner. Please note the certificate must be legally registered with the governmental authorities in the jurisdiction where it took place.
• If the dependant is the biological/adopted child of the Principal Applicant, please provide proof of the Dependant’s relationship to the Principal Applicant. Documents can include but are not limited to:
• Scan/photocopy of the original birth certificate/adoption certificate
• Any other document that provides proof of the Dependant’s relationship to the Principal applicant
[7] The Applicants interpreted this letter as a request that they provide proof of the father-child relationship between Logan and Grant. They made this assumption because of the common, colloquial use of the word “dependent”
to refer to one’s child, and because of their mistaken belief that they had submitted Grant and Janice’s marriage certificate with their original application. Accordingly, the Applicants submitted a copy of Logan’s birth certificate to IRCC on July 17. As it turns out, however, IRCC was not seeking proof of this relationship, but rather, proof of the relationship between Grant and Janice.
[8] On August 22, 2024, IRCC sent the Applicants a letter stating that their application had been rejected for the following reasons:
You were sent a letter on 2024-07-17, outlining our concerns and requesting the missing information be provided within 30 calendar days. However, as of today’s date, we have not received the missing information or a written explanation as to why you were unable to provide the information within the allotted timeframe.
[9] It was at this stage that the Applicants realized that IRCC had been requesting the Grant-Janice marriage certificate. On August 22, 2024, the Applicants requested a reconsideration, and an opportunity to provide their marriage certificate. On September 6, 2024, IRCC declined to reconsider the application, stating that reconsideration was not possible because the application was incomplete. This refusal is the decision under review.
III. PRELIMINARY MATTER: STYLE OF CAUSE
[10] Due to a clerical error, the Applicants identified Janice Mary Somers-Edgar as Jean Logan Somers-Edgar in the style of cause in this matter. They request, on consent, that the style of cause be amended to reflect that the correct party name is Janice Mary Somers-Edgar. The style of cause will be changed accordingly.
IV. ISSUES and STANDARD of REVIEW
[11] The Applicants argue that IRCC’s decision not to reconsider their application was both unreasonable and unfair. I agree that the process leading to the rejection of their application was tainted by unfairness. As such, I will limit my analysis to this issue.
[12] The standard of review for the Applicants’ procedural fairness arguments is akin to correctness. The reviewing court must ask whether the procedure was fair having regard to all the circumstances: Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54.
V. ANALYSIS
[13] The Applicants submit that the Respondent acted unfairly in rejecting their application because the correspondence requesting further documents was so vague and ambiguous that they were deprived of the right to know the case they needed to meet.
[14] More specifically, they point out that the only individuals named in the July 17 letter from IRCC were Grant and Logan, and that the letter requested proof of the relationship between the Dependant and Principal Applicant. They argue that they reasonably understood this request to be for proof of the relationship between the individuals named in the letter, and that they understood the term dependant to refer to Logan, since he is the child of Grant. They point to the common definition of the terms “dependent”
and “dependant”
and note that this definition is commonly understood to mean a child and is not commonly understood to mean a spouse. That the Applicants were genuinely confused by the IRCC request is confirmed, they say, by the fact that they promptly submitted precisely what they thought was requested – namely, Logan’s birth certificate which identifies Grant as his father.
[15] Ultimately, the Applicants argue that it would have been no burden for the Respondent to have clearly articulated what was required in their correspondence. Citing Thompson v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 914 [Thompson], the Applicants argue that they should not be faulted or penalized for relying on imprecise instructions drafted by IRCC.
[16] Not surprisingly, the Respondent has a different perspective on these proceedings. First, the Respondent submits that there is no reviewable decision, because IRCC refused to process the permanent residence application for incompleteness; it did not, in other words, refuse the application on its merits. The Respondent also notes that Logan can apply to sponsor his parents under any future parental sponsorship scheme. Therefore, the decision does not “affect a party’s rights, impose legal obligations on a party, or prejudicially affect a party directly”
: Sheikh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2020 FC 199 at paras 58-62; Mfudi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1319 at para 7; Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347 at para 29.
[17] I do not accept this argument because the determinative issue in this case relates to the actions of IRCC in the sequence of events that led to the refusal to process the application. Put differently, if (as I find below) an applicant’s failure to provide a correct document arises, at least in part, from an infringement of procedural fairness principles, the infringement cannot be shielded from judicial review through a summary rejection of the matter at hand. The corollary to this finding is that decisions, however they may be characterized, are frequently considered void ab initio, if they are rendered in a manner that was procedurally unfair: Newfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Public Utilities Board), 1992 CanLII 84 (SCC); Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Administrative Law, “Breaches of Procedural Fairness”
(5.3.(3)) at HAD-91 “Effect of breach”
(2022 Reissue).
[18] The procedural fairness issue distinguishes this case from those relied upon by the Respondent. None of the cases referenced above related to situations where applications were unprocessed based on an unfair process.
[19] In any event, having reviewed the applicable authorities, I find myself in agreement with much of the recent jurisprudence from this Court that, at the very least, has added significant nuance to the question of the justiciability of returned, incomplete applications: see for example: Devgon v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 2005; Goel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 275; Kuznetsov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 57.
[20] In the alternative, the Respondent submits that the decision was reasonable and procedurally fair because, despite having been provided with not one, but two procedural fairness letters, the Applicants did not submit a complete application and, as such, their application simply could not be processed.
[21] For the reasons that follow, I find that the Applicants’ rights to procedural fairness were infringed.
[22] To begin, I note that the content of the duty of fairness in the context of family class sponsorship applications is at the lower end of the spectrum: Kaur Sidhu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1272 at paras 26-27; Tosic-Kravic v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 452 at para 11.
[23] However, and to state the obvious, a minimal right to procedural fairness does not mean that anything goes. At a minimum, individuals must be informed of the case they must meet and be provided with an opportunity to make that case. Where correspondence is provided by IRCC, it is not too much to require that this correspondence be: 1) accurate; 2) sufficiently clear such that it may be understood; and 3) consistent with the governing legislation, which for present purposes is the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. As my colleague Justice Lafrenière stated in Thompson (at para 32):
It was the responsibility of the IRCC to provide clear instructions that are consistent with the [IRPA] and its regulations and avoid creating confusion. Applicants should not need a law degree to understand the requirements to apply for immigration or have to crosscheck government guidelines by delving into the complexities of the IRPA and its regulations to ensure consistency.
[24] In this case, I am satisfied that the IRCC correspondence did not meet these minimal requirements. First, as I observed in the hearing in this matter, the Respondent has pointed to no examples from the governing statute, regulations, or guidelines in which the terms “dependent”
or “dependant”
are used to identify a spouse. Indeed, on my own review of the governing legislation, the only relevant use of the term “dependent”
relates to the definition of dependent children: see for example, subsection 1(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. In reviewing the letter sent from IRCC to the Applicants, I therefore find that it was entirely reasonable for them to have understood that it required them to provide proof of what, to their understanding, was the dependent relationship, that being between the relationship between Logan and his parents.
[25] I recognize that, as a term of art within IRCC, the term “dependant”
may be used to describe an individual whose application accompanies a primary applicant. Once again, however, this term is not defined in the governing legislation. It is also sufficiently interchangeable with the term “dependent”
such that one may very well have required a law degree and in-depth familiarity with IRCC terminology to have understood the distinction between the two words.
[26] In reviewing the IRCC letters, I have concluded that it was not simply that they lacked clarity, but that, to the average lay person, they were actively misleading because they used terminology to describe the request for documentation that is inconsistent with common usage. It is trite to say that for a procedural fairness letter to be “fair,”
it must accurately and clearly articulate the nature of the concern. In this case, I find that the IRCC letters did not comply with this requirement. To this extent, I agree with the Applicant that this case is analogous to Thompson: see paras 26-33.
[27] In Thompson, Justice Lafrenière made it clear that “it is not the role of the IRCC to chase applicants and ensure that they provide a complete application”
(at para 37). However, in this case, the Applicants’ response to the procedural fairness letter made it crystal clear that they had simply misunderstood the nature of the request that had been put to them. As the Applicants also note (and similar again to Thompson) it would have been a simple matter for IRCC to have asked the Applicants to provide the marriage certificate for Grant Somers-Edgar and Janice Mary Somers-Edgar. Indeed, had IRCC performed this basic task, this matter would not have been litigated, and significant expenses and resources would have been saved.
VI. CONCLUSION
[28] For the above reasons, this application for judicial review will be granted and the matter will be remitted to IRCC for reconsideration. The Applicants are to ensure that proof of the relationship between Grant Somers-Edgar and Janice Mary Somers-Edgar is immediately provided to IRCC, if it has not been provided already.
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