Docket: A-84-26
Citation: 2026 FCA 119
|
CORAM:
|
GOYETTE J.A.
HECKMAN J.A.
PAMEL J.A.
|
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
|
|
THERESA NELSON
|
|
|
|
Applicant
|
|
|
|
and
|
|
|
|
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
|
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
|
|
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on June 25, 2026).
GOYETTE J.A.
[1] Ms. Theresa Nelson receives a retirement pension under the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. The Minister of Employment and Social Development determined that she was not eligible for a disability pension or a post-retirement disability benefit. Ms. Nelson appealed the denial to the Social Security Tribunal. Following a new hearing, the Appeal Division dismissed Ms. Nelson’s appeal: 2025 SST 1353.
[2] Among other things, the Appeal Division found that Ms. Nelson had not demonstrated that she had been disabled or that she had been incapable of forming or expressing an intention to apply for a disability pension. Had Ms. Nelson been disabled and incapable of forming an intention to apply, she would have been deemed to have applied for a disability pension before she started receiving retirement benefits and would therefore have been retroactively eligible for a disability pension as of when she became disabled: ss. 42(2), 44(1)(b), 60(8) to (10), 66.1(1.1), and 70(3).
[3] In this Court, Ms. Nelson seeks an order setting aside the Appeal Division’s decision and remitting the matter for reconsideration. She takes issue with the Appeal Division’s findings that she was not disabled or incapacitated.
[4] On judicial review, this Court can only intervene if the Appeal Division’s reasons and conclusions are not reasonable: Walls v. Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FCA 47 at para.7, citing Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras. 83, 86, among other decisions; Blue v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 211 at para. 35, citing Cameron v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 100 at para. 3.
[5] We find that the Appeal Division’s reasons and conclusions are reasonable. They bear the hallmarks of reasonableness: justification, transparency and intelligibility: Vavilov at para. 99.
[6] With respect to disability, the Appeal Division applied the definition of disability in subsection 42(2), which requires claimants to demonstrate that they suffer from a “severe”
and “prolonged”
disability that renders them “incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation.”
The Appeal Division then reviewed the evidence and found that it did not establish disability under the Canada Pension Plan: Decision at paras. 14, 16–22. While it acknowledged Ms. Nelson’s serious medical condition in 1997, the Appeal Division noted that her diagnosis could not be equated with a severe disability under the Canada Pension Plan: Decision at para. 19, citing Klabouch v. Canada (Minister of Social Development), 2008 FCA 33. We find nothing unreasonable with such a finding given the record before the Appeal Division.
[7] As for incapacity, the Appeal Division said that it was “beside the point”
because, having failed to demonstrate that she was disabled, Ms. Nelson could not claim a disability benefit. The Appeal Division nevertheless addressed incapacity.
[8] The Appeal Division recognized that the test for incapacity is not the same as the one for disability: Decision at paras. 25–26; see also Smith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 122 at para. 78. Relying on relevant statutory provisions and this Court’s jurisprudence, the Appeal Division said that the test asks whether a claimant has the mental capacity to form or express an intention to apply for disability benefits: Decision at paras. 27–32, citing subsections 60(8) and (10); Canada (Attorney General) v. Danielson, 2008 FCA 78; Blue; and Walls, among other cases. Ms. Nelson agrees that this is the applicable test, but she says it was misapplied.
[9] Ms. Nelson essentially argues that the Appeal Division failed to grapple with the evidence that she put before it. We disagree. Based on the record, we cannot conclude that, in reaching its conclusions, the Appeal Division misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it: Vavilov at para. 126.
[10] We will therefore dismiss the application. Since the respondent does not ask for costs, none shall be awarded.
"Nathalie Goyette"
Email this Content