Docket: A-235-24
Citation: 2025 FCA 168
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CORAM: |
STRATAS J.A.
MONAGHAN J.A.
GOYETTE J.A.
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BETWEEN: |
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RICHARD FEARING |
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Applicant |
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and |
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GARDAWORLD CASH SERVICES CANADA CORPORATION |
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Respondent |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on September 17, 2025).
STRATAS J.A.
[1] Mr. Fearing seeks to quash the Board’s decision on June 18, 2024 (2024 CIRB LD 5375). The Board upheld a decision of a Labour Affairs Officer. That Officer found that Mr. Fearing’s complaint for the non-payment of certain wages, made under subsection 251.01(1) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, was outside the six-month limitation period set out in paragraph 251.01(2)(a) of the Code.
[2] In this case, the Board had to make just one factual finding: the date of Mr. Fearing’s complaint. With that finding, it could apply the six-month statutory limitation period and decide whether Mr. Fearing’s complaint was timely.
[3] The Board did exactly that. It found that Mr. Fearing did not make the complaint about unpaid wages for the period of April 8, 2019 to April 17, 2019 until August 22, 2020, well beyond the six-month statutory limitation period in paragraph 251.01(2)(a) of the Code. Mr. Fearing’s complaint was not timely.
[4] The Board also found, reasonably, that there was no statutory basis on which the Board could have extended the limitation period for Mr. Fearing to make the complaint. The clear and unambiguous text of subsection 251.01(3) of the Code confirms that no extension of time was available on these facts.
[5] Mr. Fearing submits that the Board should have granted an extension of time for his wage complaint because it was an ongoing violation of the collective agreement or could have been part of a civil action. His submission is without merit. Under subsection 251.01(3) of the Code, the Board had no power to extend the time for Mr. Fearing to make a subsection 251.01(1) complaint on those grounds.
[6] Overall, the Board identified and applied the relevant statutory provisions, reviewed the evidence before it, considered Mr. Fearing’s arguments, and rendered a decision that was substantiated, rational, logical and supported by the evidence.
[7] The Board considered this matter without an oral hearing. It had the power to do so under section 16.1 of the Code and, given the simplicity of this case, it was justified in doing so. Reviewing this record, we see no other procedural grounds for interfering with the Board’s decision. Mr. Fearing was aware of the case to meet and had a full opportunity to meet it.
[8] In oral argument, Mr. Fearing submits that his complaint was not a wage complaint under the Code but rather was a complaint against a training practice of the employer. This is at odds with the information he provided to the Board on his complaint form and what he wrote in paragraph 8 of his memorandum of fact and law. In our view, it was open to the Board to characterize his complaint as a wage complaint under the Code, one subject to the six-month statutory limitation period in paragraph 251.01(2)(a) of the Code. That characterization was reasonable.
[9] Overall, for the reasons set out above, the Board’s decision was reasonable.
[10] Therefore, we will dismiss the application with costs.
“David Stratas”
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