Chambers v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 257

ORDER

UPON THE MOTION by the Applicant Mr. Chambers [the Applicant], for an Order staying his removal from Canada to Jamaica, in which the removal is scheduled for February 25, 2026;

AND UPON READING and CONSIDERING the materials filed by the parties in support of their respective positions on the Applicant’s motion;

AND UPON HEARING and CONSIDERING the oral submissions made by the parties by videoconference on February 24, 2026;

AND CONSIDERING that an order staying a removal is a form of extraordinary equitable relief requiring the exercise of the Court’s discretion having regard to all of the relevant circumstances, that the applicable test is highly contextual and fact dependent, and that “Ultimately, the question is whether granting the injunction would be just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case” (Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 at para 1);

AND CONSIDERING that to be successful on this motion, the Applicant must satisfy the conjunctive tripartite test described in Toth v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1988 CanLII 1420 (FCA), 86 NR 302 [Toth] and in RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR-MacDonald].

AND CONSIDERING that this legal test requires that the Applicant demonstrate that, 1) their application raises a serious issue to be tried; 2) they would suffer irreparable harm if their removal is not stayed; and 3) the balance of convenience favours staying their removal. The test is conjunctive (Janssen Inc v Abbvie Corporation, 2014 FCA 112 at para 14) in that the “failure of any of the three elements of the test is fatal” (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishaq, 2015 FCA 212 at para 15), even though the three parts of the test are not “watertight compartments” (Pak v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1898, at para 24, and the jurisprudence cited therein [Pak]);

AND CONSIDERING that the threshold for establishing a serious question to be determined is generally low, and that the judge on the stay motion must make a preliminary assessment of the merits of the case to ascertain whether the application is neither vexatious nor frivolous and, if satisfied that the proceeding is neither vexatious of frivolous, then proceed to consider the second and third prongs of the test, even if of the opinion that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the merits (RJR-MacDonald, at page 337);

AND CONSIDERING that, in the absence of serious grounds to challenge an administrative decision, a stay pending judicial review amounts to no more than a free-standing request for delay which is not justified in light of subsection 48(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], which requires a removal order to be enforced “as soon as possible” (Ogunkoya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 679 at para 6);

AND CONSIDERING that the second prong of the test requires that the moving party establish that irreparable harm would be suffered between the date of removal and the hearing of their proceeding on the merits without the stay being granted;

AND CONSIDERING that the prejudice to be established must be more than the harm or prejudice that is inherent in the removal process, and that the moving party has the onus to present clear and non‑speculative evidence at a convincing level of particularity demonstrating a real probability that unavoidable irreparable harm will result in the absence of the extraordinary remedy of a stay (Glooscap Heritage Society v Canada (National Revenue), 2012 FCA 255 at para 31 [Glooscap]; Erhire v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 FC 941 at para 65);

AND CONSIDERING that the harm alleged and proven must constitute more than a series of possibilities and may not be based on mere assumptions, speculation or hypotheticals and contingencies, or assertions (Atwal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 427 at paras 14-15);

AND CONSIDERING that the last prong of the test requires balancing the prejudice the applicant would suffer if removed against the prejudice suffered by the Respondent who would be prevented for enforcing the law, and determining who would suffer the greatest harm from the granting or refusal of the stay (Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd v Manitoba Food & Commercial Workers, Local 832, 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 at para 36; Universal Ostrich Farms Inc v Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FCA 164 at para 50);

AND CONSIDERING that the public interest favours having removal orders promptly enforced as scheduled and in the Respondent Minister exercising his statutory duty to apply the IRPA (Pak, at para 71). Section 48 of the IRPA requires the enforcement of removal orders as soon as possible, not simply a “question of administrative convenience, but as a matter that implicates the integrity and fairness of, and public confidence in, Canada’s system of immigration control” (Ghanaseharan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 261 at para 22);

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant’s argument made on this motion as to the existence of a serious issue that the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] decision maker who determined the Applicant’s spousal sponsorship application by their decision dated November 17, 2025, unreasonably came to the opinion that the Applicant had led insufficient evidence to establish rehabilitation to overcome his inadmissibility despite the time elapsed without a new criminal conviction since his last criminal conviction in the United States of America, ties established in Canada, and rehabilitation activities undertaken to demonstrate concrete and lasting changes, seeks to have this Court reweigh and reassess the evidence submitted to the IRCC decision maker and come to a different conclusion without alleging that the IRCC decision maker made a fundamental error in fact finding that undermines the acceptability of the decision to be reviewed;

AND CONSIDERING that reweighing evidence, second guessing the decision maker’s assessment of that evidence, and coming to different conclusions on judicial review is not the Court’s function on judicial review (Doyle v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237, at paras 2 to 5);

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant suggests but does not assert a procedural fairness argument in his argument on this motion;

AND CONCLUDING that the Applicant has therefore not met the threshold of establishing that his application raises a serious issue that is neither frivolous nor vexatious;

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant argues that he and/or his spouse will suffer irreparable harm if the sought stay is not granted because:

• a)the Applicant will no longer be eligible under the in-land class for a spousal sponsorship permanent resident application, and would lose the benefit of his now rejected spousal sponsorship application;

• b)the Applicant’s spouse requires the Applicant to support her because of her problems with arthritis and problems from a previous wrist injury;

• c)the Applicant’s spouse is distressed with the prospect of the Applicant’s removal and has been prescribed unspecified antidepressants; and,

• d)the consequences of removal on the Applicant and his spouse are more than the ordinary consequences of removal;

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant is at liberty to reapply for permanent residence from outside of Canada pursuant to the IRPA, and therefore has not lost the right or ability to apply for permanent residence in Canada despite being removed. The need to apply for spousal sponsorship from outside Canada is an inherent consequence of the removal process and does not constitute irreparable harm (Chung v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 CanLII 86083 (FC) at para 8; Ostapowicz v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 55675, at para 22; Konak v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 111601, at para 25);

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant’s application for judicial review may continue if leave is granted, may be argued while he is outside of Canada, and may still be remedially effective should he be successful on the merits;

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant has not established in the circumstances of this proceeding that the potential mootness of his application for judicial review constitutes irreparable harm (El Ouardi v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FCA 42, at para 9);

AND CONSIDERING that the separation of family, the loss of support, and the rupture of daily life are not a sufficient basis on which to ground a finding of irreparable harm (Atwal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 427, at paras 14-15);

AND CONSIDERING that the medical evidence led by the Applicant with respect to his spouse’s medical and mental health conditions do not reflect that either are unmanageable without the Applicant being present in Canada;

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant has not established that he or his spouse would suffer irreparable harm from his removal through clear and convincing, non-speculative and detailed evidence that rises to the level required by the jurisprudence to establish unavoidable irreparable harm;

AND CONSIDERING that the irreparable harm otherwise alleged by the Applicant is consistent with the usual consequences of removal and does not establish irreparable harm (Melo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 15140, at para 21);

AND CONCLUDING that the Applicant has not met the threshold required by the jurisprudence to establish a serious issue or irreparable harm, does not satisfy the cumulative three-part test for a stay to be issued, and must fail as a result (Toth and RJR-MacDonald);

AND CONSIDERING that the Applicant has not established that the balance of convenience favours delaying the Minister in the performance of his duties of removal pursuant to section 48 of the IRPA;

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. The Applicant’s motion for a stay of removal is dismissed.