Docket: IMM-4273-25
Citation: 2026 FC 444
Toronto, Ontario, April 7, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ferron
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BETWEEN: |
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Kehinde Eniola Tijani |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] Mrs. Kehinde Eniola Tijani, the Applicant, is a citizen of Nigeria. She seeks the judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] dated January 28, 2025 [Decision]. In its Decision, the RAD dismissed the Applicant’s appeal of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD]’s decision and agreed with the RPD that the Applicant was neither a Convention refugee within the meaning of section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], nor a person in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA.
[2] The determinative issue was the Applicant’s credibility. The RAD agreed with all but one of the RPD’s credibility findings. It concluded that the credibility findings maintained were “sufficient to rebut the presumption of truthfulness”
and that the Applicant’s testimony could not “be relied on to establish her allegations”.
These negative credibility findings largely flowed from inconsistencies between the Applicant’s personal narrative in her Basis of Claim [BOC] form and her testimony at the RPD hearing, and from the concern that the letters of support from the Applicant’s father and fiancé were not authentic. Both the RPD and RAD found that the letters were too similar in their wording and formatting to be genuine.
[3] The Applicant submits that the RPD and the RAD inappropriately treated her BOC narrative as an “encyclopedia”
of her life and held her “to a higher standard, without due regard for her personal circumstances”.
The Applicant also alleges that the RAD failed to specify whether it found that the Applicant’s fiancé was indeed her cousin, and that this was a significant gap in its analysis. The Applicant’s argue that this goes to the issue of whether her child will be considered an “abomination”
if she goes back to Nigeria. She also argues that the RAD engaged in a “microscopic assessment of the evidence,”
failed to analyze the evidence before it “holistically”,
and was zealous in its efforts to find issues with her evidence.
[4] Moreover, the Applicant submits that the RAD’s finding regarding her residual profile was unreasonable because the analysis focused on “a few positive aspects of the Applicant’s profile, without due regard for the Applicant’s true position and the objective evidence which demonstrated that she was at risk of discrimination and significant hardship”.
[5] The Respondent submits that the RPD and the RAD are entitled to make “reasonable findings based on implausibility, common sense and rationality”
and for a “credibility finding to be unreasonable, it must have been made in a perverse or capricious manner, without regard to the evidence”
. Overall, the Respondent submits that the RPD and RAD were entitled to draw the conclusions that they did and that the Applicant has failed to establish that the credibility findings are unreasonable.
[6] For the reasons that follow, this application for judicial review will be dismissed.
II. Facts
[7] The Applicant, who was represented by counsel, filed a personal narrative with her BOC Form that is 24 paragraphs long. While the Court reviewed all of the Applicant’s allegations, for the purpose of this judgment, the summary of the facts provided by the RAD is sufficient:
“The Appellant fears harm from the elders in her family, who want to subject her to a cleansing ritual, claiming her fiancé, Abdul, is a cousin of hers, and that she committed an abomination by becoming pregnant with his child. The Appellant also fears her fiancé’s extended family who want to prevent the Appellant’s child from inheriting Abdul’s ancestral property. In particular, she fears her fiancé’s uncle, AA, who wanted Abdul to marry MC’s daughter. MC, who she also fears, is a chief political thug for the president of Nigeria.”
[8] The Applicant arrived in Canada on September 30, 2023. She claims that any contact she had with Mr. Abdul ceased shortly after their child was born, on March 4, 2024.
III. The RPD's decision
[9] The hearing before the RPD occurred on September 19, 2024. On October 16, 2024, the RPD rendered its decision and denied the Applicants’ refugee claim because it found that she was not credible for multiple reasons.
[10] The RPD found numerous credibility issues with her testimony. For instance, at the hearing, the Applicant said she was making a refugee claim because she was afraid of elders in her father’s family. They believe that the Applicant had a child with her cousin, and therefore that she has committed an abomination that is “affecting this whole society”.
Because of this belief, they wanted her to abort her baby and participate in a cleansing ritual. Yet, in her BOC form, she claimed she was afraid of her fiancé’s family. In fact, in her BOC, there is no mention of any fear from her own family.
[11] The RPD also found that the Applicant’s testimony, regarding what happened when she fled to her mother’s village after she became pregnant, was not credible. She testified that men came and beat “everybody”,
that she fled from them, fell and sustained an injury on her leg, and that a man beat her and slapped her. Yet, when the RPD asked her why the BOC form never mentions that she was attacked by the men who came to her mother’s village, she responded by saying that when she wrote the BOC narrative she was not “mentally okay”.
The RPD was not satisfied with her explanation and found that if the attack had indeed occurred it should have been mentioned in the BOC form. The RPD decided that this was a material omission that displaced the presumption of truthfulness, that the attack did not occur, and that it was reasonable to draw a negative inference “with respect to her overall credibility”.
[12] Furthermore, the RPD noted multiple inconsistencies between the general timeline provided in the BOC and the one from the Applicant’s testimony, including on key events leading to her departure for Canada. The RPD found that these inconsistencies were not reasonably explained. These key events occurred in a short period of time, just over a year before her testimony and she had the assistance of counsel to prepare her narrative and testimony.
[13] The RPD also took issue with the Applicant’s lack of detail regarding where she lived and that her testimony did not accord with the address history in her Record of Submission.
[14] Finally, the RPD also found that the Applicant’s support letters from Abdul and her father were too similar in their wording and formatting to be genuine, given that she had testified that the two men were not on speaking terms:
“…it is not credible that two individuals, who have no current connection to one another, would write two separate letters using nearly identical language in parts of their letters. I do not accept the claimant’s explanation. As a result, I find these letters were not written by her fiancé or her father and find on a balance of probabilities, that they are not genuine letters and were fabricated for the purposes of her refugee claim. I therefore assign them no weight and draw a negative inference with respect to the claimant’s overall credibility due to her submission of fabricated documentation.”
[15] The RPD found that cumulatively these credibility issues rebutted the presumption of truthfulness, that the Applicant was not credible, and that it could not rely on the Applicant’s BOC narrative or testimony to “credibly establish her claim for refugee protection”
. The RPD then turned its mind to the corroborating documentary evidence and found that much of it was unrelated to the heart of the refugee claim. Overall, the RPD found that the documentary evidence was insufficient to overcome the credibility issues and to establish the veracity of her allegations.
IV. The Decision Under Review
[16] The RAD agreed with all but one of the RPD’s credibility findings. It did not accept the RPD’s finding that the inconsistencies between the Applicant’s testimony and her Record of Submission with respect to some of her past addresses were material. The RAD found that these addresses were not relevant to the claim given that they related to her life before the key events in her BOC are said to have occurred. Further, it concluded that any inconsistencies could reasonably be explained by the fact that the Applicant testified that she was moving from place to place for short periods of time.
[17] However, the RAD found that the attack the Applicant claimed she experienced in her mother’s village should have been mentioned in her BOC narrative. It relied on Ramos Gapi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1893 (CanLII) to support the proposition that “oral testimony may provide details not included in the narrative, and should not serve to impugn a claimant’s credibility, unless the incident omitted is a significant one to the claim”
. The RAD found that the omission of this specific incident was significant and material because “a physical assault elevates the risk the Appellant is potentially facing from the agents of harm, and so it is significant to her claim”.
[18] The RAD did not accept the Applicant’s explanation for the omission either. The decision maker did note that the Applicant had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and had been undergoing counselling. It also acknowledged that individuals who experience trauma may have difficulties presenting their case “including recalling specific times, dates, and locations, recounting events in chronological order, and recalling certain events fully”
. However, the RAD concluded that there was no evidence suggesting that the Applicant’s trauma and mental health issues impaired her memory “to the extent that she would not be able to recall such a significant event as an assault, when completing her narrative”
.
[19] The RAD also analyzed the timeline from the Applicant’s BOC narrative in detail to compare it with the one from her testimony. It agreed with the RPD that the inconsistencies between the two timelines were significant. The RAD said that “[c]onsidering there are only a few events involved, and considering the RPD hearing occurred just over a year after the Appellant left Nigeria, it is reasonable to expect that the Appellant would describe these events in a consistent manner in both her narrative and her testimony.”
It then considered the Applicant’s mental health and trauma and found that this was not an adequate explanation for the inconsistencies either. It noted that the medical evidence did not indicate that her ability to recall the order of events was impaired. The RAD also remarked that the Applicant had the benefit of counsel and the opportunity to review her narrative on multiple occasions, including when she filed an amended narrative on August 1, 2024. The RAD found that “all the events alleged which led to her fleeing Nigeria are material in establishing her risk of persecution or harm”,
so this warranted a negative credibility finding.
[20] The RAD also agreed with the RPD that the letters of support were not genuine and gave them no weight. The decision maker’s reasoning was essentially identical to the RPD’s reasoning:
“I find it implausible that two individuals, who have no contact with each other, would write two separate letters with the same font, formatting, and multiple instances of near-identical phrasing. On a balance of probabilities, I find these letters are not genuine.
I find the Appellant’s willingness to provide non-genuine information in support of her claim seriously undermines her overall credibility.”
[21] After finding the presumption of truthfulness rebutted, the RAD considered whether the documentary evidence could assuage its credibility concerns. Here, the RAD considered identity documents, education documents, employment and volunteer letters from Canada, the Applicant’s son’s birth certificate, the death certificates of Mr. Abdul’s parents, an unverified picture that allegedly shows MC with the Nigerian president, an unverified picture that allegedly shows MC with his daughter, several news articles about MC, an article about child marriage and forced marriages, and objective country evidence showing that cleansing rituals are common in certain areas in Nigeria. In the end, most of this documentary evidence was given little or no weight because it was general in nature and did not relate to the agents of harm, failed to establish a connection between the Applicant and MC, was unclear and unverified, or simply had no probative value in determining if the Applicant’s allegations were true.
[22] For instance, the RAD acknowledged that there is some objective country condition evidence showing that the Applicant’s community in Nigeria could see her being “intimate”
with a cousin as an abomination, and the response very well could be to subject her to a cleansing ritual. However, it concluded that this evidence had “low probative value in establishing the Appellant’s allegations considering it is generalized evidence only and does not relate to the specific alleged agents of harm”
.
[23] The RAD did note that the RPD failed to analyze some of the documents, which could have at least some probative value. Amongst them were the Applicant’s son’s birth certificate and the death certificate of her fiancé’s parents. The RAD found that this evidence proved “that the Appellant had a son with her fiancé and that his parents have passed away”
. However, the RAD also found that this evidence provides “…low probative value in establishing that [she] has been targeted by any of the alleged agents of harm”
.
[24] Overall, the RAD found that the documentary evidence was insufficient to establish the Applicant’s allegations on a balance of probabilities. The RAD found that the credibility concerns warranted giving no weight to the Applicant’s BOC and testimony. The Applicant’s documentary evidence did not outweigh the credibility concerns and could not establish the Applicant’s allegations.
[25] Regarding the Applicant’s residual profile, the RAD indicated that:
“The [Applicant] argues that the RPD ignored the serious possibility of the Appellant being harmed with her child should they go back to Nigeria. The [Applicant] maintains that considering she has a newborn baby and is single-handedly taking care of this child, the RPD should have critically analyzed the documents before making a decision.
It is unclear if the [Applicant] is suggesting she would face an increased risk from the alleged agents of harm, having given birth, or whether she is suggesting that she faces a serious possibility of persecution in Nigeria, based on her profile as a single parent. I have therefore considered both these arguments”.
[26] The RAD found that the Applicant had failed to establish that she would face a serious possibility of persecution upon her return to Nigeria on the basis of her profile. To reach this conclusion, the RAD examined the country condition evidence. While the RAD accepted that the Applicant may face social stigma and discrimination in obtaining employment and housing, it found that in the Applicant’s case, the risk of stigma in finding housing and employment was reduced. This finding was based on the fact that the Applicant lives in southern Nigeria where single motherhood is more common, she was self-employed in the retail sector for a number of years, she speaks English and Yoruba, she has international work experience, and her parents still accept her and could likely help her find housing.
V. Submissions to this Court
A. The Applicant’s submissions
[27] The Applicant raises two issues: whether the RAD’s assessment concerning the Applicant’s credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence was reasonable, and whether the RAD’s assessment of the Applicant’s residual profile was reasonable.
[28] The Applicant submits that the RAD engaged in a microscopic evaluation of the claim by focusing on peripheral matters and failing to evaluate the claim in a holistic manner. The Applicant also submits that the RAD failed to consider how her diagnosis of anxiety and depression, her limited education, her pregnancy, and her limited understanding of the “legal and refugee process”
would all impact her ability to convey her story. For example, the RAD focused on the omission of a specific event in her BOC narrative without considering her testimony. And, while it accepted that trauma can impact an individual’s ability to recall events in chronological order, it then found that the medical evidence did not indicate that the Applicant suffered from this issue.
[29] The Applicant also submits that the RAD’s treatment of the support letters was unreasonable because the RAD failed to consider that the Applicant’s father and fiancé may, unbeknownst to Ms. Tijani, have been in touch at the time they were drafted. The Applicant proposes that the RAD’s finding on this issue is indicative of a zeal to find issues in the evidence.
[30] The Applicant also argues that the RAD failed to explain whether it accepted that Abdul was the Applicant’s cousin. This alleged gap in the RAD’s reasoning is said to be significant because, despite the Applicant’s lack of credibility, “a positive finding would require the Panel to explain why that would not put her at risk in light of the objective country evidence”.
[31] To support her arguments, the Applicants referred to numerous cases that stand for the propositions that (1) decision makers are supposed to give individuals the benefit of the doubt if they are satisfied with the Applicant’s general credibility, (2) they ought not to look for weaknesses in the Applicant’s evidence with zeal, (3) inconsistencies in an Applicant’s evidence ought not ground a negative credibility finding unless they are major and central to the claim, (4) decision makers should refrain from exaggerating inconsistencies in an Applicant’s evidence, (5) decision makers ought not to rely solely on inconsistencies between an Applicant’s BOC form and oral testimony, and (6) when inconsistencies arise, decision makers are obliged to take into account any circumstances or explanations that could explain the inconsistencies.
[32] The Applicant also argues that the objective country evidence was sufficient to establish a serious possibility of persecution. She submits that the RAD could not dismiss the newspaper articles and other evidence related to the situation in Nigeria simply because it was “generalized evidence.”
Under section 96 of IRPA, “there is no requirement for a refugee claimant to demonstrate personalized risk, and […] objective country evidence may be sufficient to establish risk where the objective evidence applies to the Applicant’s profile and personal circumstances”
(citing Turetken v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 357 at para 21).
[33] The Applicant further submits that the RAD failed to consider all the factors affecting her residual profile holistically and completely. For example, the RAD failed to consider the Applicant’s subjective fear of the Nigerian police, as well as consider, holistically, how her single motherhood, limited education, elementary work experience, diagnoses of anxiety and depression, and Muslim faith, affect her residual profile. The Applicant relies on Limarto v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 521 at paragraph 22, which quotes the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status”
to argue that even if some negative measures themselves do not amount to persecution, when they are combined with other general adverse factors, the cumulative effect can amount to persecution. The Applicant submits that “the objective evidence demonstrates a heightened risk for persons similarly situated to the Applicant, and many of those risks were identified by the RAD but not analysed holistically, but rather discretely, which is unreasonable”.
[34] Moreover, the Applicant suggests that despite the finding against her overall credibility, certain key facts regarding her profile were accepted as proven by the RAD, namely:
“a. The RAD found that the Applicant has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and is undergoing counselling.
b. The RAD found that the Applicant did indeed have a relationship with her fiancé Abdul, and she had a son with her fiancé Abdul and that his parents have passed away.
c. The RAD accepted that MC has high-ranking political connections and has been known to act violently with the use of political thugs.
d. The RAD accepted that the Applicant is Yoruba and some of the objective evidence concerning the country conditions for issues such as cleansing rituals in the culture, gender-based violence and the targeting by elders of those accused of abominations (such as a relationship with a cousin).
e. The RAD accepted that the Applicant is a single mother with a basic high school education and a young child.”
[35] The Applicant submits that these accepted facts should have been considered holistically in the analysis of her residual profile, but they were only considered separately “in a manner which isolated each factor”.
In her view, this is a substantial error on the part of the RAD and renders the Decision unreasonable.
B. The Respondent’s Submissions
[36] The Respondent begins by referring to paragraphs 20-26 of Lawani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 924, regarding the principles that govern the manner in which decision makers are obliged to assess the credibility of refugee claimants. Based on these principles, the Respondent submits that the credibility concerns raised by the RAD were major and related to central aspects of the Applicant’s claim. The Respondent also submits that the RAD was attentive to the explanations provided to explain the inconsistencies but rejected them. The Respondent further argues that “[d]etermining an applicant’s credibility constitutes the heartland of the RPD and RAD’s jurisdiction”
and credibility findings are unreasonable only when made “in a perverse or capricious manner, without regard to the evidence”
(Onwuasoanya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1765 [Onwuasoanya] at para 10).
VI. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law on Credibility
[37] Both parties submit that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. The Court agrees. Credibility determinations go to the merits of a decision (Abdulrazekh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 898 at para 14), making reasonableness the presumptive standard of review (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 16 [Vavilov]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [Mason]). None of the situations warranting a rebuttal of this presumption arise in the present judicial review (Vavilov at paras 33, 53; Canada Post Corp v Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67 at para 27 ; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at paras 26-28).
[38] In Smajlaj v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 821, Justice Gascon provides a good summary of the role of a reviewing Court when the standard of review is reasonableness:
[11] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov at para 85; Mason at para 64). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” (Vavilov at para 99). Both the outcome of the decision and the decision maker’s reasoning process must be considered in assessing whether these hallmarks are met (Vavilov at paras 15, 95, 136).
[12] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” (Vavilov at para 13), without “reweighing and reassessing the evidence” before it (Vavilov at para 125).
[13] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” (Vavilov at para 100)
[39] Deference is particularly important when credibility findings are at play. As summarized by Justice Rochester (as she was then) in Onwuasoanya at paragraph 10:
Credibility determinations are part of the fact-finding process, and are afforded significant deference upon review (Fageir v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 966 at para 29 [Fageir]; Tran v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 721 at para 35 [Tran]; Azenabor v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1160 at para 6). Such determinations by the RPD and the RAD demand a high level of judicial deference and should only be overturned “in the clearest of cases” (Liang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 720 at para 12). Credibility determinations have been described as lying within “the heartland of the discretion of triers of fact […] and cannot be overturned unless they are perverse, capricious or made without regard to the evidence” (Fageir at para 29; Tran at para 35; Edmond v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 644 at para 22, citing Gong v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 165 at para 9).
(See also Lubana v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 116 (CanLII) at paras 7-9)
[40] I agree with the Respondent that in Lawani at paragraphs 20-26, Justice Gascon provided a thorough and all-encompassing summary of the principles that govern the manner in which decision makers are obliged to assess the credibility of refugee claimants. Given the issues in the present matter, these passages are worth reciting at length:
[20] It is useful to start by summarizing the main principles governing the manner in which an administrative tribunal like the RPD must assess the credibility of refugee applicants (Guven v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 38 at paras 34-42; Gong v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 165 at paras 8-9; Tovar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 598 at paras 19-22; Ismaili v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 84 [Ismaili] at paras 31-42).
[21] First, when they swear to the truth of certain allegations, refugee applicants are presumed to tell the truth (Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1979 CanLII 4098 (FCA), [1980] 2 FC 302 (FCA) at para 5). However, this presumption of truthfulness is not unchallengeable, and an applicant’s lack of credibility may suffice to rebut it. For example, the presumption is rebuttable where the evidence is inconsistent with the applicant’s sworn testimony (Su v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 666 at para 11, citing Adu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] FCJ No 114 (FCA) (QL)), or where the RPD is unsatisfied with the applicant’s explanation for those inconsistencies (Lin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 183 at para 19).
[22] Second, even though they may be insufficient when taken individually or in isolation, the accumulation of contradictions, inconsistencies and omissions regarding crucial elements of a refugee claim can support a negative conclusion about an applicant’s credibility (Sary v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 178 at para 19; Quintero Cienfuegos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1262 at para 1). I pause to underscore the well-accepted statement that the RPD is best positioned to assess an applicant’s credibility, as it has the benefit of hearing his or her testimony (Jin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 595 at para 10).
[23] Third, the RPD cannot base a negative credibility finding on minor contradictions that are secondary or peripheral to the refugee protection claim. The decision-maker must not conduct a too granular or overzealous analysis of the evidence. In other words, not all inconsistencies or implausibilities will support a negative finding of credibility; such findings should not be based on a “microscopic” examination of issues irrelevant to the case or peripheral to the claim (Attakora v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 99 NR 168 (FCA) at para 9; Cooper v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 118 [Cooper] at para 4).
[24] Fourth, a lack of credibility concerning central elements of a refugee protection claim can extend and trickle down to other elements of the claim (Sheikh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1990 CanLII 13057 (FCA), [1990] FCJ No 604 (FCA) (QL) at paras 7-8), and be generalized to all of the documentary evidence presented to corroborate a version of the facts. Similarly, it is open to the RPD not to give evidentiary weight to assessments or reports based on underlying elements found not be credible (Brahim v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1215 [Brahim] at para 17).
[25] Fifth, credibility findings should not be made based strictly on the absence of corroborative evidence (Ndjavera v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 452 [Ndjavera] at para 6). However, when there is a valid reason to question a refugee claimant's credibility, further negative credibility inferences can be drawn if the claimant is unable to provide an explanation for the lack of reasonably expected corroborative evidence (Ndjavera at para 7). Where corroborative evidence should reasonably be available to establish essential elements of a claim and there is no reasonable explanation for its absence, a decision-maker can draw a negative inference of credibility based on the claimant’s lack of effort to obtain such corroborative evidence (Ismaili at paras 33, 35).
[26] Finally, the RPD is also entitled to draw conclusions concerning an applicant’s credibility based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality. It can reject evidence if it is inconsistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole, or where inconsistencies are found in the evidence (Shahamati v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 415 (FCA) (QL) at para 2; Mohamed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1379 at para 25; Yin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 544 at para 59; Lubana at para 10). A finding of implausibility must however be rational, sensitive to cultural differences and clearly expressed (Rahal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319 [Rahal] at para 44). The RPD’s conclusions and inferences on a claimant’s credibility must always remain reasonable and the analysis must be formulated in “clear and unmistakable terms” (Hilo v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 1991 CanLII 14469 (FCA), 130 NR 236 (FCA) [Hilo] at para 6; Cooper at para 4; Lubana at para 9). Situations where implausibility findings can be made include where the applicant’s testimony is outside of the realm of what could reasonably be expected, or where the documentary evidence demonstrates that the events could not have taken place as alleged. Conversely, merely casting a “nebulous cloud” over the reliability of the evidence will be insufficient, as the RPD must state why credibility is affected in more than vague and general terms (Hilo at para 6).
[41] Finally, our court has confirmed that a global negative credibility finding cannot be made until all evidence central to the claim is considered (Marku v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1096 at paras 22-25 citing Iqbal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1219, Ruiz v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1339 at para 9).
B. The Decision is Reasonable
[42] This court has stated that the “benefit of the doubt… applies in a limited number of circumstances.”
It should be given only “when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility”,
which assumes that the applicant’s statements are “coherent and plausible”
(Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Gebrewold, 2018 FC 374 at para 28, citing Noga v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 454 at paras 10-12). This is not the case here. The various decisions cited by the Applicant can all easily be distinguished from the facts of this case. In the present matter, the RAD (and the RPD) had significant concerns regarding the Applicant’s credibility – so much so that the Applicant’s testimony and BOC were given no weight. There is therefore no room for the benefit of the doubt.
[43] Second, the RAD’s credibility findings were supported by the evidence. They were adequately and rationally justified. They were neither perverse nor capricious. Further, the RAD made its global negative credibility finding only after carefully considering all of the evidence central to the Applicant’s claim.
[44] The Court agrees that the inconsistencies and omissions in the Applicant’s evidence were not minor details. For instance, the Applicant’s alleged attack at her mother’s village should have been mentioned in her BOC form. The Court agrees that this attack was central to her claim because it elevates the personalized risk that she faced in Nigeria. The Court also agrees that the entire sequence of events that led to her fleeing Nigeria, was central to the Applicant’s refugee claim. The circumstances regarding how she escaped from Nigeria are not minor details. The RAD considered the Applicant’s explanation, namely her trauma and anxiety diagnosis. It concluded that there was no evidence that neither of these issues impaired her ability to remember what occurred or the order of the events. These findings were not unreasonable.
[45] As Justice McDonald explained when faced with a similar situation in Ogaulu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 547:
[18] The requirements for the completion of a BOC form are outlined in the Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256 and referenced in the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. The BOC is intended to provide details about the claimant, his or her family, related documents, travel history, and most importantly the reason refugee protection is being sought. This Court has confirmed on numerous occasions that all the important facts and details of a claim must be included, and failing to do so can affect the credibility of all or part of a claimant’s testimony (Zeferino v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 456 at para 31v).
[19] The Applicant argues that his oral testimony simply provided additional details to his BOC narrative and he relies upon Selvakumaran v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 623 [Selvakumaran] at paragraph 21 to argue that this should not be a basis for impugning his credibility. However, Selvakumaran explicitly states at paragraph 20 that, although oral testimony may provide details not included in a personal information form, this will not serve to impugn an applicant’s credibility unless the omitted incident is significant to the claim.
[20] Here, details of the attack are significant as they go to the very core of the Applicant’s claim. Therefore this omission from the BOC is not a minor detail or collateral information, but rather, is important to the Applicant’s claim. Omissions and contradictions are a reasonable basis for doubting an applicant’s credibility (Jele v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 24 at para 50).
[46] The RAD’s concerns regarding the support letters were also reasonable. Before this Court, the Applicant has argued that the RAD failed to consider that the Applicant’s father and fiancé could have been in contact when the letters were written. However, the Applicant testified at the RPD hearing that once the “issues”
started, her father and fiancé stopped talking to each other. The RAD considered this testimony when it concluded: “I find it implausible that two individuals, who have no contact with each other, would write two separate letters with the same font, formatting, and multiple instances of near-identical phrasing”.
The RAD also indicated “[a]lthough identification documents have been provided with the letters, these letters are not sworn documents so the identity of the authors of the letters was not verified by a commissioner of oaths, or a notary or lawyer. The identification documents, even if authentic on their own, do not establish that the Appellant’s father and fiancé wrote the letters.”
These conclusions were not unreasonable under the circumstances.
[47] The RAD also provided a detailed and thorough analysis of the documentary evidence and the objective country condition evidence. It was open for the RAD to conclude that the Applicant’s claim could not be supported by the documentary evidence. The documentary evidence provided to the RAD was either irrelevant entirely or only supported the Applicant’s claim indirectly.
[48] It was also open for the RAD to conclude that the Applicant failed to establish that she and her child are at risk of facing persecution if they return to Nigeria. While the RAD recognized that the Applicant may be at risk of experiencing stigma in finding housing and employment, the RAD’s conclusion that these risks do not amount to persecution was not unreasonable. The RAD’s finding that some of the Applicant’s personal circumstances (such as the fact that she will be living in Southern Nigeria where single motherhood is more common, has international work experience, and her parents are swilling to accept her and can assist her in finding housing) may reduce this risk of stigma was also not unreasonable.
[49] The Applicant has argued that it was unreasonable for the RAD to conclude that her parents are part of the Applicant’s support network. However, according to the Applicant’s own testimony and BOC, her mother already assisted her in finding housing. It was not unreasonable for the RAD to think that she would be inclined to do so again, especially given that the Applicant said that her parents are still willing to accept her.
[50] As for the Applicant’s argument that the RAD did not address whether Abdul was the Applicant’s cousin, given that the RAD found that her testimony and BOC had no weight because of the credibility concerns, there was no evidence for the RAD to rely on to even attempt such a finding. The Applicant did not provide any other evidence to establish that Abdul was her cousin or that people in Nigeria think that he is her cousin. In fact, although the RAD accepted that the Applicant had a child with her fiancé, the RAD specifically stated: “I have found the Appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, her allegations relating to her relationship with her fiancé and her pregnancy”.
Reading the reasons holistically, this statement clearly refers to the fact that the “family relationship”
between Ms. Tijani and her fiancé has not been established. Therefore, it was reasonable for the RAD not to address the possibility that people in Nigeria may think the Applicant is married to her cousin in the analysis of her residual risk of persecution.
[51] Overall, the reasoning of the Decision is logical, the basis for giving the Applicant’s testimony no weight is justified, and the reasoning is transparent. Thus, given the high deference owed to RAD’s credibility findings, the Court will not intervene.
[52] Lastly, the analysis of the Applicant’s residual profile was reasonable. As mentioned above, the Applicant highlights certain facts that were accepted by the RAD but claims that the RAD failed to meaningfully consider them in its analysis of the risk that she would face if she returned to Nigeria. She submits that the RAD considered them in silos rather than “holistically”.
She further submits that the RAD “selectively relied on the few positive aspects of the Applicant’s profile, without due regard for the Applicant’s true position and the objective evidence which demonstrated that she was at risk of discrimination and significant hardship”.
[53] For instance, the Applicant argues that while her diagnoses and counselling are mentioned in the Decision, they are not specifically mentioned in the forward-looking residual profile risk analysis. However, the Applicant did not articulate how suffering from depression and anxiety would, alone or with other personal characteristics, put her at risk of persecution – as opposed to mere hardship – in Nigeria. Furthermore, she did not point to any specific passage of the objective country evidence, or to any other evidence, on this point.
[54] With respect to MC, while the RAD accepted that he was well connected and known to act violently, they also concluded that there was no proof of any link between MC and the Applicant or between MC and her fiancé. As a result, it was not unreasonable to not mention MC as a possible agent of harm in the Applicant’s future.
[55] The fact that RAD did accept that the Applicant had a relationship with her fiancé Abdul, that she had a son with him, and that his parents have passed away does not establish that he was her cousin. It also does not establish that people believed he was her cousin. Again, the RAD specifically indicated that the Applicant “has not established, on a balance of probabilities, her allegations relating to her relationship with her fiancé and her pregnancy”.
Given this finding, it was not unreasonable for the RAD not to give more importance to her Yoruba identity. Having found her testimony not credible, and the evidence related to any blood link with her fiancé insufficient, the RAD did not have to consider the impact of this identity unless it constituted a risk, in of itself.
[56] Still, the RAD did consider the risk that Ms. Tijani might face as a single mother at length. It concluded that while she might face some discrimination, she would not face a serious possibility of persecution including because single motherhood is more common, and less discriminated against, in the south, particularly in large cities.
[57] The Applicant’s lack of post-secondary education was also discussed by the RAD. However, while they found that she could face hardship and discrimination, it concluded that this would not amount to persecution. The RAD also positively considered her foreign work experience and her support network. Applicant’s counsel did not point to anything in the record that would allow the Court to disturb this finding.
[58] Ultimately, while counsel for the Applicant argues that these different elements were ignored although “the objective country evidence demonstrates a heightened risk for persons similarly situated to the Applicant”,
they never point out to any specific passage of the evidence that would demonstrate how a more holistic or intersectional reading could have led to the conclusion that the Applicant might face more than hardship. This appears to have also been the case before the RAD as they themselves noted that the Applicant failed to point to “any specific objective country evidence that such a profile would subject her to a serious possibility of persecution”.
[59] Given all of the above, the Court is far from convinced that the RAD failed to take a holistic approach in its analysis of the Applicant residual profile. On the contrary, the RAD’s thorough analysis withstands scrutiny.
VII. Conclusion
[60] For the above reasons, the Decision is not unreasonable and the application for judicial review will be dismissed.
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