Date: 20260429

Docket: IMM-6756-25

Citation: 2026 FC 570

Toronto, Ontario, April 29, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ahmed

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicant, Kuburat Bolatito Amodu, seeks judicial review of a negative pre-removal risk assessment (“PRRA”) made by a senior immigration officer (the “Officer”), dated February 11, 2025.

[2] The Applicant submits that the negative PRRA is unreasonable because the Officer disregarded risks to the Applicant based on her mental health status and her faith.

[3] For the reasons that follow, I find that the Officer’s decision is reasonable. Accordingly, I dismiss this application for judicial review.

II. Background

[4] The Applicant is a 57-year-old citizen of Nigeria

[5] On February 2, 2018, the Applicant most recently entered Canada on a temporary visitor’s visa to see her daughter.

[6] On October 23, 2020, the Applicant filed a refugee claim. She based her claim on the persecution she faced from her former romantic partner and his extended family, including his other romantic partners and children, due to her conversion from Islam to Christianity.

[7] In a decision dated April 6, 2022, the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) refused the Applicant’s refugee claim. The determinative issue was credibility. In a decision dated August 26, 2022, the Refugee Appeal Division (“RAD”) affirmed the RPD’s determination.

[8] On November 11, 2024, the Applicant applied for a PRRA. She specified that she faced continued threats from her former partner and his extended family. She also described that returning to Nigeria would trigger fear and sadness, leading to the potential recurrence of her post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) symptoms. In her PRRA application, she included support and character letters along with a report from a psychotherapist.

[9] In a letter dated February 12, 2025, the Officer refused the Applicant’s PRRA.

[10] The Officer relied on Kim v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 437 at paragraph 70, to determine that they could not consider humanitarian and compassionate factors. They consequently excluded the Applicant’s character reference letters and her report from a psychotherapist.

[11] The Officer also emphasized that the RPD and the RAD’s determination as to the Applicant’s stated risk was final, subject only to the possibility that new evidence shows that the Applicant is exposed to a new, different or additional risk that was not contemplated by the RPD in accordance with Escalona Perez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1379 at paragraph 5. After referencing portions of the RPD and RAD’s decisions, the Officer determined that the Applicant’s PRRA submissions relied on the same risk that had already been assessed.

[12] In any case, regarding the Applicant’s risk from her former partner and his extended family, the Officer noted that the Applicant had stated during the RPD hearing that she converted to Christianity in 2006 yet included her former partner on her application for permanent residency in Canada in 2011. The Officer also noted that the Applicant’s former partner was born in 1936, and that there is a lack of evidence that, at his current age, he poses a threat to the Applicant.

[13] The Officer further found that the Applicant had not rebutted the presumption of state protection in Nigeria. The Officer determined that the Applicant’s assertion that the police do not often intervene in cases like hers was insufficient given that she had not actually sought police intervention.

[14] The Officer further reviewed country condition documents and determined that there were no personalized, forward-looking risks to the Applicant. The Officer therefore denied the Applicant’s PRRA.

[15] This is the decision presently under review.

III. Issue and Standard of Review

[16] The Applicant submits that the Officer’s PRRA determination breached the rights of natural justice. Although both of the Applicant’s counsels referred to procedural fairness in the hearing, none of their submissions actually relate to issues of procedural fairness. Rather, the submissions from the parties address a challenge to the merits of the decision, and I consequently find that the only issue in this application is whether the PRRA determination is reasonable (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”) at para 16).

[17] Reasonableness is a deferential, but robust, standard of review (Vavilov at paras 12-13). The reviewing court must determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible, and justified (Vavilov at para 15). A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker (Vavilov at para 85). Whether a decision is reasonable depends on the relevant administrative setting, the record before the decision maker, and the impact of the decision on those affected by its consequences (Vavilov at paras 88-90, 94, 133-135).

[18] For a decision to be unreasonable, the applicant must establish the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant (Vavilov at para 100). Not all errors or concerns about a decision will warrant intervention. A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing evidence before the decision maker, and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances (Vavilov at para 125). Flaws or shortcomings must be more than superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision, or a “minor misstep” (Vavilov at para 100).

IV. Analysis

[19] The Applicant principally submits that the Officer failed to consider the risks to the Applicant deriving from the inadequate healthcare and inhumane treatment of those with mental illness in Nigeria. The Applicant also submits that the Officer engaged in a selective analysis of the country condition documents to conclude that the Applicant did not face a forward-looking or personalized risk in Nigeria. The Applicant maintains that the Officer erred in determining that the Applicant’s risks were generalized because her mental health and the threats she had received from her family were specific to her circumstances in Nigeria.

[20] Relying on Islam v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 320 (“Islam”), the Respondent submits that the Officer reasonably concluded that the Applicant’s mental health concerns were properly characterized as humanitarian and compassionate considerations. The Respondent’s position is also that, absent new evidence, or changes to the country conditions in Nigeria, the Officer could not re-evaluate the Applicant’s refugee claim.

[21] In my view, the Officer’s decision is not perfect, but there is no reviewable error warranting this Court’s intervention.

[22] At the hearing, counsels for the Applicant submitted that the Applicant had made submissions regarding persecution due to her mental health. Counsels pointed to the Applicant’s letter to the Officer stating that if she were removed from Canada, she would lose access to the mental health support she receives in Canada and that it “could” impact her mental health and “would potentially” trigger recurrence of her PTSD symptoms. Counsels for the Applicant also noted that the Applicant had provided a psychotherapist report to the Officer. However, the psychotherapist’s report is a summary of how the Applicant described her condition to a psychotherapist during one interview and primarily focuses on the mental health impacts that the Applicant describes as deriving from her persecution in Nigeria from her former romantic partner, a risk that was already assessed and dismissed by the RPD and the RAD.

[23] Indeed, the only indication of persecution based on mental health that the Applicant provided to the Officer were general country condition documents, which were not referenced in the Applicant’s letter or written submissions to the Officer. Considering this context, it was reasonable for the Officer to conclude that the Applicant’s submissions on her mental health were related to humanitarian and compassionate considerations.

[24] At the hearing, the Applicant’s counsels relied largely on Lakatos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1174 (“Lakatos”) at paragraph 17 to submit that even if the Applicant made no submissions regarding the risk of persecution, or inadequate treatment of her mental health condition due to persecution, the Officer should have considered the risks to her based on the National Documentation Package (“NDP”). I do not find Lakatos to be of assistance to the Applicant’s case. I note first that Lakatos was decided based on a correctness standard of review, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov, and as such I treat its analysis with caution as to whether it reflects the current state of the law (Lakatos at para 12; Vavilov at paras 60, 141). Additionally, the decision in Lakatos specifically notes that the applicants had described their sur place claim in their amended narrative and it was evident in the certified tribunal record (Lakatos at paras 14, 17-18). That is not the context in the case before me, where the Applicant neglected to make submissions regarding her persecution in Nigeria based on her mental health before the Officer. Considering these fundamental differences between Lakatos and the case at bar, I find that this case cannot support the Applicant’s position.

[25] Rather, I agree with the Respondent’s submissions that Islam bears a closer resemblance to the facts before me. In that case, my colleague Justice Régimbald determined that it was not incumbent on the RAD to comb through the NDP in order to assess the accessibility of mental health supports in the applicants’ home country (Islam at para 26). Justice Régimbald described that medical care in the context of the case would be more appropriately considered in the context of an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (Islam at para 26). Although Islam pertains to a decision from the RAD on the admission of new evidence, I find that the principle that applicants bear the onus of presenting their case reflects the jurisprudence on PRRA determinations as well.

[26] Indeed, it is well-established that a PRRA officer does not bear the burden of compiling evidence to support the applicant’s case by combing through the NDP (Idu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1081 at paras 32-35; Li v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1461 at para 24; Magonza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 14 at para 79).

[27] This reflects the principles in Vavilov that administrative decision makers are not bound to a standard of perfection and do not have a duty to conduct an analysis on every argument or line of possible analysis (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50 at para 48; Vavilov at para 128).

[28] While I encourage sensitivity amongst PRRA officers about the potential for persecution based on the applicant’s mental health status, in this case there was a lack of any argument regarding any such persecution. In absence of such arguments on the record, the Officer reasonably considered that the psychological issues raised by the Applicant were outside their purview (Covarrubias v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 365 at paras 35, 39, 41; Dabar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1564 at para 9).

[29] Regarding the Applicant’s other submissions, I find that the Officer reasonably restricted their analysis to factors that had not been previously assessed by the RPD or the RAD. As my colleague Justice Duchesne described, a PRRA is not an opportunity for a failed refugee claimant to re-litigate the RPD or the RAD decision (B Saleh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1402 at para 30). Indeed, I agree with my colleagues Justice Gleeson and Justice Blackhawk in their assessment that the same risks raised previously should be considered only where there is new evidence or a change in country conditions (Haq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 370 at para 16; Mensah v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 157 at para 23; Raza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 at paras 12-16).

[30] In this case, the Applicant did not present any new evidence or identify a change in country conditions since the RPD and the RAD’s determinations. Therefore, the Officer reasonably concluded that the Applicant’s risk of persecution by her former romantic partner and his family were previously assessed and rejected by both the RPD and the RAD. The Officer’s consideration of other factors in the record before them that support the RPD and the RAD’s determination, including the age of the alleged persecutor and the Applicant’s inclusion of her alleged persecutor in her permanent residency application, do not constitute a reviewable error.

[31] Given that the Officer reasonably determined that the Applicant’s psychological report, character letters and previously assessed risks could not be the basis for a positive PRRA, the Officer then considered the general country conditions in Nigeria. They assessed the potential for state protection and Nigeria’s human rights record. Although they affirmed that this record is far from spotless, there was no additional grounds on which to establish a personalized risk to the Applicant. This conclusion reflects the facts and arguments before the PRRA Officer at the time of their decision. Accordingly, I do not find any basis in law for this Court to intervene.

V. Conclusion

[32] For these reasons, I find that the Officer’s determination reflects the applicable factual and legal constraints (Vavilov at para 85). The Officer considered all of the evidence before them and determined that the Applicant would not face a risk contemplated under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. I consequently dismiss this application for judicial review.

[33] The parties did not raise any question for certification, and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-6756-25

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. This application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. There is no question for certification.

“Shirzad A.”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: