Docket: IMM-906-14
Citation:
2014 FC 912
Vancouver, British Columbia, September 23, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Mactavish
BETWEEN:
|
KIN WAH TAO
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Background
[1]
When Kin Wah Tao was 19-years-old and living in Hong Kong, he was convicted of claiming membership in a Triad Society and of possessing
Triad Society materials, for which he was sentenced to two years probation. The
uncontradicted evidence before the Court is that for a period of several months
in the mid-1970s, Mr. Tao worked as a waiter and “booth
guide” in an illegal sex club run by the Triad. According to Mr. Tao,
in addition to waiting tables, he would also escort prostitutes to meet with
their clients at the club. Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Tao
himself was ever involved in any acts of violence during the time that he was
associated with the Triad Society.
[2]
Mr. Tao says that he left the Triad Society
immediately after his arrest in 1976, and that he has lived a law-abiding life
ever since. There is no evidence that Mr. Tao has had any brushes with the
law in the nearly 40 years since his convictions.
[3]
Mr. Tao has since married a Canadian citizen
and applied for permanent residence in Canada as a member of the Spouse in
Canada class. In his application, he also sought an exemption on humanitarian
and compassionate [H&C] grounds from his inadmissibility for being a member
of an organization that is believed on reasonable grounds to be, or have been
engaged in organized crime.
[4]
Karine Roy-Tremblay, a Director of Case
Determination (“Minister’s Delegate”) at Citizenship and Immigration
Canada rejected Mr. Tao’s request for humanitarian and compassionate
relief. She found that Mr. Tao was inadmissible to Canada under paragraph
37(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and that it would
be contrary to the objectives of the Act to allow him to stay in Canada.
[5]
I have concluded that the Minister’s Delegate’s
inadmissibility finding was reasonable, but that her decision to deny an
exemption to Mr. Tao on humanitarian and compassionate grounds was not.
Consequently, the application for judicial review will be allowed, in part.
II.
The Inadmissibility Finding
[6]
Paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA] provides
that:
37. (1) A
permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of
organized criminality for
(a) being a member of an organization
that is believed on reasonable grounds to be or to have been engaged in
activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity planned and organized
by a number of persons acting in concert in furtherance of the commission of
an offence punishable under an Act of Parliament by way of indictment, or in
furtherance of the commission of an offence outside Canada that, if committed
in Canada, would constitute such an offence, or engaging in activity that is
part of such a pattern …
|
37. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour criminalité
organisée les faits suivants :
a) être membre d’une organisation dont
il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle se livre ou s’est livrée à
des activités faisant partie d’un plan d’activités criminelles organisées par
plusieurs personnes agissant de concert en vue de la perpétration d’une
infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation ou de la
perpétration, hors du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada,
constituerait une telle infraction, ou se livrer à des activités faisant
partie d’un tel plan …
|
[7]
In making a finding under paragraph 37(1)(a) of
the Act, an immigration officer is also guided by section 33 of IRPA,
which provides that:
33. The facts
that constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising
from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there
are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or
may occur.
|
33. Les faits — actes ou omissions — mentionnés aux articles 34 à
37 sont, sauf disposition contraire, appréciés sur la base de motifs
raisonnables de croire qu’ils sont survenus, surviennent ou peuvent survenir.
|
[8]
The Supreme Court of Canada described the “reasonable grounds to believe” evidentiary standard in Mugesera
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 100, as requiring “something more than mere
suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on
the balance of probabilities”. The Court went on to hold that reasonable
grounds will exist “where there is an objective basis for
the belief which is based on compelling and credible information”: at
para. 114.
[9]
Mr. Tao argues that the Minister’s Delegate
misunderstood the nature of his criminal convictions in Hong Kong, wrongly
assuming that he had been convicted of being a member of a Triad
Society. I do not accept this submission. The Minister’s Delegate’s reasons
accurately describe Mr. Tao’s convictions. Her finding that Mr. Tao
was a member of a Triad Society was based upon his own admissions and those of
his family members, rather than the nature of Mr. Tao’s convictions.
[10]
Mr. Tao insists that he was never formally
initiated into a Triad Society. Be that as it may, the term “member”, as it is used in the inadmissibility
provisions of IRPA, is to be given a broad and unrestricted
interpretation, and does not require formal initiation into or membership in
the organization in question: see Gebreab v. Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FC 1213 at para. 24, [2009] 359
F.T.R. 296, aff’d 2010 FCA 274. In light of this, Mr. Tao has not
persuaded me that the Minister’s Delegate’s finding that he was a member of a Triad
Society was unreasonable.
[11]
Mr. Tao also notes that the Minister’s
Delegate did not specifically identify the Triad Society of which he was a
member, arguing that not all Triad Societies in Hong Kong are engaged in
illegal activities. Mr. Tao submits that the only evidence regarding the
illegal activities of the Triad Society to which he belonged was his own
evidence regarding its involvement in the keeping of a bawdy house – an
activity that is no longer illegal in Canada in the wake of the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC
72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101.
[12]
It is true that the Triad Society to which Mr.
Tao belonged is not specifically identified in the Minister’s Delegate’s
reasons. However, in determining whether a decision is reasonable, the
reviewing Court must pay respectful attention to the reasons that were offered
by the decision-maker, or which could have been offered in support of a
decision. To the extent that a tribunal may not fully explain certain aspects
of its decision, the reviewing Court may look to the record in assessing the
reasonableness of the outcome: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’
Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at paras.
14-15, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708.
[13]
In his interview with an immigration officer in
connection with his application, Mr. Tao was asked for the name of the
Triad Society to which he belonged. The transcript of that interview records
his answer phonetically as “Seen Ye Un” and
includes the note “Possibly Sun Ye On?” The
Minister’s Delegate consulted a 2010 newspaper article entitled “Hong Kong
Triads” which identifies Sun Yee On as the largest criminally active triad in Hong Kong, with some 25,000 members. From this it can reasonably be concluded that the
Minister’s Delegate was satisfied that Mr. Tao was a member of the Sun Yee
On Triad Society.
[14]
Mr. Tao has not taken issue in his
affidavit with the interpretation of the answer he gave at his interview, nor
has he denied that the Triad Society he worked for was in fact the Sun Yee On
Triad Society.
[15]
Mr. Tao submits that he was never provided
with the newspaper article relied upon by the Minister’s Delegate, arguing
that he was denied procedural fairness as a result. However, the article
was general country condition information that was publicly available on the
internet, with the result that there was no obligation on the Minister’s
Delegate to disclose it to Mr. Tao: Mancia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 F.C. 461 at para. 22, 226 N.R. 134 (C.A.).
[16]
Mr. Tao has also not taken issue with the newspaper
article’s contents in his affidavit, nor has he indicated what additional
information he would have provided to the Minister’s Delegate, had he been
provided with a copy of the article for comment. In these circumstances, I am
not persuaded that there has been any breach of procedural fairness here.
[17]
The evidence before the officer was that in
addition to involvement in prostitution, criminal Triads in Hong Kong such as
the Sun Yee On Triad Society were engaged in drug trafficking, extortion,
illegal gambling and racketeering - activities that are all illegal in Canada and meet the test for serious criminality in section 37 of IRPA.
[18]
Given that Mr. Tao admitted to membership in
the Sun Ye On Triad Society, a criminal organization that is involved in
activities that are illegal in Canada, it follows that the Minister’s
Delegate’s finding that Mr. Tao was inadmissible to Canada under paragraph
37(1)(a) of IRPA was one that was reasonably open to her.
III.
The Prematurity Argument
[19]
As I understand his argument, Mr. Tao says
that it is premature to refuse his application for permanent residence on
section 37 inadmissibility grounds at this stage, and that the application
should not be refused unless and until the Immigration Division of the Immigration
and Refugee Board confirms that Mr. Tao is inadmissible under section 37
of IRPA.
[20]
This argument is itself premature: the
jurisdiction of the Immigration Division is only engaged once a report has been
prepared under section 44 of IRPA and that report has been referred to
the Board for an inadmissibility hearing. There is no evidence before me that
any such report has been prepared in this case, and Mr. Tao’s argument is
thus a hypothetical one.
IV.
The Humanitarian and Compassionate Decision
[21]
In support of his application for H&C
relief, Mr. Tao relied upon the presence of his wife, son, daughter and
step-child in Canada. Mr. Tao’s mother, brother and two sisters also live
in the Vancouver area, and he has no family members living anywhere outside of Canada.
[22]
At the time of his application, Mr. Tao had
been in Canada for some four years. He was not working, but was caring for his
elderly mother.
[23]
The Minister’s Delegate’s analysis commenced
with the observation that Mr. Tao was seeking an exemption from his “serious inadmissibility on organized criminality grounds”.
While the Delegate appears to have been aware of the age of Mr. Tao’s
convictions, there is no mention in her analysis of the lack of violence
associated with his Triad activities, or the fact that the Hong Kong courts did
not deem Mr. Tao’s conduct to have been serious enough to warrant a
custodial sentence. Nor does it appear that the Minister’s Delegate gave any
weight to Mr. Tao’s apparently unblemished record for the 36 years
preceding his application for permanent residence.
[24]
Instead, after reviewing Mr. Tao’s
establishment factors, the Minister’s Delegate concludes with the observation
that “Mr. Tao is inadmissible to Canada on serious grounds and it would be contrary to the objectives of IRPA and the
Government of Canada commitments to allow him to stay in Canada”.
[25]
This statement is troubling as it suggests that
the Minister’s Delegate denied Mr. Tao H&C relief because he was
inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 37(1)(a) of IRPA. This indicates
a fundamental misunderstanding of the Minister’s Delegate’s H&C
jurisdiction – a jurisdiction that is only engaged once inadmissibility has
been established.
[26]
At the time of Mr. Tao’s application,
section 25 of IRPA specifically contemplated that H&C relief
could be afforded to those found to be inadmissible to Canada for organized
criminality under section 37 of the Act. Thus Mr. Tao’s membership in a
criminal organization was not a bar to his receiving H&C relief, but was
instead the reason why such relief was being sought in the first place.
[27]
Once inadmissibility was established under
paragraph 37(1)(a) of IRPA, the Minister’s Delegate’s task was to consider
all of the relevant circumstances in determining whether H&C relief
should be granted. For the Minister’s Delegate’s discretion to be properly
exercised, factors favouring the granting of H&C relief had to be carefully
weighed against those militating against it.
[28]
That did not happen here. Rather than weighing
the positive and negative factors relating to Mr. Tao’s application, the
Minister’s Delegate employed circular reasoning to conclude that Mr. Tao
should not be entitled to H&C relief because he is inadmissible to Canada
under paragraph 37(1)(a) of IRPA. This renders this aspect of the
Minister’s Delegate’s decision unreasonable, with the result that the
application for judicial review will be granted, in part.
V.
Conclusion
[29]
While there is no basis for interfering with the
Minister’s Delegate’s finding that Mr. Tao is inadmissible to Canada under
paragraph 37(1)(a) of IRPA, the decision will be set aside insofar as it
relates to the refusal of Mr. Tao’s application for H&C relief. Mr. Tao’s
request for H&C relief will be remitted to a different Minister’s Delegate
for re-determination in accordance with these reasons.
VI.
Certification
[30]
Mr. Tao has proposed the following question
for certification:
Is the refusal of
the permanent residence application of a foreign national premature upon the
determination of his inadmissibility under section 37(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, given the fact that he may be referred under
section 44 of the Act for an inadmissibility hearing before the Immigration
Division, who has the power to grant the foreign national permanent resident
status under section 45 of the Act at the conclusion of the hearing?
[31]
Given my conclusion that there is no factual
foundation for the question at this time, the issue does not arise in this
case. Consequently, I decline to certify it.