Docket: IMM-5011-13
Citation:
2014 FC 557
Ottawa, Ontario, June 10, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
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BETWEEN:
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BERTA INES NUNEZ CALDERON
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YESID LOZADA ROBLES
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
The Applicants seek a judicial review of a
decision by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board [RPD], dated May 9, 2013, wherein, it was determined that neither
applicant was a Convention refugee under section 96 nor a person in need of
protection under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001 c 27 [IRPA].
II.
Background
[2]
The Principal Applicant, Mrs. Berta Ines Nunez
Calderon, and her husband, Mr. Yesid Lozada Nobles, are both citizens of Columbia.
[3]
Prior to 2006, the Principal Applicant claims
that she helped her uncle operate a farm in Libano Tolima, Columbia, by
performing accounting duties and purchasing supplies for the farm. She also ran
errands for him. At the time, the Principal Applicant resided in Bogota, which is located 7 hours away from Libano Tolima.
[4]
The Principal Applicant claims that the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] largely controls the area where her uncle’s
farm was located. She claims he was, thus, frequently required to pay the gang
money in exchange for protection.
[5]
Over time, as the Principal Applicant’s uncle’s
farm became more profitable, the FARC demanded more money. Her uncle, however,
was unwilling to pay the increased amount demanded, and the FARC began to steal
swine and cattle from his farm.
[6]
On November 23, 2006, the Principal Applicant
claims that armed men kidnapped her uncle from the farm. She states that she
immediately contacted the police and the military, who were able to find the
kidnappers and attempt to rescue her uncle on that same day; however, her uncle
and three members of the FARC were killed in the rescue effort.
[7]
After the death of her uncle, the Principal
Applicant claims that the FARC began calling her home and threatening to kill
her. In her affidavit, the Applicant explains that she believes this was due to
her employment with the Congress of the Republic of Colombia and her connection
with her uncle’s farm. Additionally, she believes it was due to her having called
the police and the military in regard to her uncle’s disappearance.
[8]
In 2007 and 2008, the Principal Applicant states
that she received weekly threats by the FARC. She filed several complaints with
the authorities in regard to the threats; however, they were unsuccessful in
finding the perpetrators and decided to close her file.
[9]
In March 2009, the Principal Applicant claims
armed, masked men entered her condominium building, harassed the security
guard, and wrote death threats in blood on the walls of the building. She
states that they also left pamphlets referring to a criminal organization
called the Aguilas Negras.
[10]
The Principal Applicant claims that this new
threat from the Aguilas Negras was likely caused by her association with her
ex-spouse, Mr. Hernando Lopez Arango.
[11]
In 2009 and 2010, the Principal Applicant claims
she continued to receive threats, either from the FARC or the Aguilas Negras,
despite changing her telephone number several times.
[12]
On November 17, 2010, the Principal Applicant
claims her home was broken into and the gas therein was left on while she and
her husband were away at work. After this incident, she decided to leave her
home to live with friends and family.
[13]
Approximately one year later, in 2011, the
Applicants obtained visitor visas for the United States. On or around November
30, 2011, they left Columbia, traveled through the United States and arrived in
Canada on December 2, 2011. They claimed refugee status the same day.
[14]
The RPD rejected the Applicants’ claim for
refugee status on May 9, 2013 which is the underlying application before this
Court.
III.
Decision under Review
[15]
In its decision, dated May 9, 2013, the RPD
rejected the Applicants’ claim for refugee status after having determined that
the Applicants were not credible. The RPD concluded that the Applicants were
not credible based on the following reasons:
a)
It was implausible that the Principal Applicant
helped manage her uncle’s farm as she claimed (in essence, that she was his
“right hand”), since she lived 7 hours away and worked full-time as a secretary
for the Congress of the Republic of Colombia;
b)
The Principal Applicant provided contradicting
information as to how she learned of her uncle's kidnapping. In her Personal
Information Form [PIF], the Principal Applicant stated that an employee on the
farm contacted her to inform her; however, at the hearing, she explained that her
aunt had informed her.
c)
It was implausible that the Principal Applicant
would have reported her uncle’s disappearance and not that of his wife;
d)
It was implausible that the police and the
military would have acted so quickly to locate the Principal Applicant’s uncle
as he was only a local farmer. The RPD was not convinced that she had
sufficient influence as a secretary working for the Congress of the Republic of Colombia to mobilize such a response;
e)
It was implausible that the police and military
found and captured the kidnappers on the same day that the Principal
Applicant’s uncle disappeared; the RPD noted that, even missing public figures
in Columbia have taken weeks, sometimes months, to locate. Additionally, the
Principal Applicant filed her report with the Bogota police, which made it
further implausible that the police and military could be mobilized so rapidly
in Libano Tolima;
f)
The Principal Applicant provided contradicting
information as to where her uncle’s wife resided. In her PIF, the Principal
Applicant indicated that her uncle’s wife and children moved from the farm
following his death; however, when asked about his wife during the hearing, the
Principal Applicant indicated that her uncle’s wife did not reside on the farm
with him, but rather, she resided in Libaye, Columbia;
g)
The Principal Applicant continued to live and
work at the same place for 4 years, despite receiving weekly death threats. She
was never attacked or kidnapped during that time;
h)
It was implausible for the FARC to have
discovered the Principal Applicant’s affiliation with her uncle, in addition to
her contact information, from invoices left on her uncle’s farm.
[16]
The RPD did find it plausible that the Principal
Applicant’s uncle may have owned a farm and may have been targeted by the FARC;
however, the RPD found that the Applicants had not demonstrated that they,
themselves, had been victimized by the FARC.
IV.
Issue
[17]
Did the RPD err in making its decision without
regard to the evidence before it?
V.
Relevant Legislative Provisions
[18]
The following legislative provisions of the IRPA
are relevant:
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96. A Convention
refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion,
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96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié —
la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race,
de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou
de ses opinions politiques :
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(a) is
outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
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a) soit
se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
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(b) not
having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
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b) soit,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle
avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut
y retourner.
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97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a
country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would
subject them personally
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97. (1) A qualité
de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
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(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
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a) soit
au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
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(b) to a
risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
if
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b) soit à
une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités
dans le cas suivant :
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(i) the person is
unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
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(ii) elle y est
exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de
ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is
not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard
of accepted international standards, and
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(iii) la menace ou
le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au
mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés
par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to
provide adequate health or medical care.
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(iv) la menace ou
le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux
ou de santé adéquats.
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(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
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(2) A également qualité de personne à
protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie
de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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VI.
Position of Parties
[19]
The Applicants claim that the RPD erred by
failing to consider all of the relevant evidence before it; namely, complaint
letters to the Columbian authorities found at Exhibits P-10 to P-16 of the
Applicant’s Record. The Applicants argue that these letters confirm the
credibility of their narrative.
[20]
The Respondent submits that the RPD did not fail
to consider any corroborative documentary evidence. The Respondent asserts that
there was no objective evidence presented to corroborate that the Applicants
were being targeted by the FARC or that the Principal Applicant’s uncle had
been kidnapped and killed. Moreover, as the Principal Applicant’s testimony was
deemed not credible, the Respondent maintains that the RPD appropriately
assigned little probative value to the documentary evidence.
VII.
Standard of Review
[21]
The applicable standard of review in respect of
findings of credibility and assessment of evidence is that of reasonableness (Aguebor
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 NR 315 (FCA)
at para 4).
VIII.
Analysis
[22]
It is trite law that the RPD cannot make an
adverse credibility finding while ignoring evidence by a claimant explaining
apparent inconsistencies in their application (Soto v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 354). Where such a situation
arises, this Court will be inclined to infer that the RPD made an erroneous
finding of fact (Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (1998), 157 FTR 35, 83 ACWS (3d) 264 at para 15); however, it
is important to note that the onus falls on an applicant to show that such
evidence was ignored. As a general rule, the RPD is presumed to have weighed
and considered all of the evidence before it (Hassan v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), (1992), 36 ACWS (3d) 635, 147 NR 317 (FCA);
Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598
(FCA) (QL/Lexis); Cepeda-Gutierrez, above). Therefore, in the absence of
clear proof that a relevant and significant piece of evidence was not
considered by the RPD, the RPD’s conclusions on credibility must stand (Hosseini
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 402, 116 ACWS
(3d) 95 (FCTD)).
[23]
In the present case, the Applicant claims that
the RPD did not consider their complaint letters to the Columbian authorities
found at Exhibits P-10 to P-16 of the Applicant’s Record in making its adverse
credibility findings; however, in their submissions, the Applicants indicate
that they will “refrain from making representations on
the Tribunal’s credibility findings” (Applicant’s Written
Representations at para 12). The Court is perplexed as to what the Applicants
are then seeking, if not specifically a review of the RPD’s credibility
findings?
[24]
A review of the record clearly shows that the
RPD acknowledged this documentary evidence in its decision, confirming that the
Principal Applicant had filed several complaints with the Columbian authorities
after her uncle’s death (RPD decision at para 7 and 15). While it may not have
fully engaged with it in its decision, it is clear that the RPD was alive and
alert to it. The Court is not convinced that the RPD did not take this evidence
into consideration.
[25]
In any event, the Applicants have not
demonstrated how this evidence assists them whatsoever in corroborating their narrative.
The Applicants are correct that the complaint letters do corroborate an attempt
to obtain state protection; however, state protection was not at issue before
the RPD. The evidence in question does not address (or rebut) a single
credibility concern raised by the RPD; which was at the very heart of the
present matter.
[26]
As recently reminded by this Court in Jia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 422, findings of credibility
lie at the heart of a tribunal’s expertise in determining the plausibility of
testimony and drawing inferences from the evidence. When negative findings with
respect to an applicant’s credibility are made, they are generally dispositive
of the claim; unless the record contains reliable and independent documentary
evidence to rebut it (Sellan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FCA 381, 384 NR 163).
[27]
In light of its many credibility concerns, and
without any reliable and independent evidence on the record to assuage those
concerns, the RPD was open to decide as it did. The Applicants have not
demonstrated how its decision does not fall within the range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law
therein (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para
47).
IX.
Conclusion
[28]
For all of the above reasons, the Applicants’
application for judicial review is dismissed.