Docket: IMM-1002-14
Citation:
2015 FC 475
Ottawa, Ontario, April 16, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
|
NAIM KERQELI
|
Applicant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is the judicial review of a decision of the
Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
[RPD/Board] wherein the Applicant was found to be neither a refugee nor a
person in need of protection.
[2]
As this matter is being sent back for a new
determination because of a breach of fairness and natural justice, the Court
will not comment on the reasonableness of the determinative issue of state
protection or nexus to a Convention ground.
II.
Background
[3]
The Applicant is a citizen of Kosovo who alleges
fear of persecution due to his membership in a particular social group, the
Ashkali.
[4]
He claims that in March 2012, his brothers were
involved in a business opportunity and something occurred, which resulted in
the investors’ money being taken by a third party. Six of the investors seeking
the return of their investment threatened the Applicant’s brothers. The
brothers fled to Canada where their refugee claims were upheld by the Board – a
matter raised in the Applicant’s claim. He was self-represented at the Board.
[5]
In June 2013, the Applicant returned to Kosovo
from Afghanistan where he was working. Shortly thereafter the investors
approached the Applicant, then residing in Gjilan, Kosovo, and demanded the
Applicant to return E60,000. These approaches continued for weeks until the six
men threatened the Applicant with a gun. He then reported the matter to police
but because nothing further was done by the police, the Applicant ascribed this
to ethnic bias.
[6]
The Applicant left Gjilan for Lipligan, a
reasonable distance away by Kosovo standards, but the investors tracked him
down within a month and again threatened him. He then left Kosovo for Canada.
[7]
The Applicant’s claim was dismissed on the basis
of absence of nexus to a Convention ground and on the presumption of state
protection in Kosovo. His removal was stayed by this Court.
[8]
At the Board hearing, the Applicant was not
represented by counsel. This has led to the argument that because of what was
said by the Board, the Applicant did not understand that he was entitled to
make final submissions at the end of the evidentiary phase of the RPD hearing.
[9]
The critical passages in respect of the above
are:
Member: … Since you are self represented, I’m going to
explain to you the process. Now, I would lead with the questions, so I’ll start
with my questions for you. And then you may have information that you think I
should know, that I haven’t asked you about, or you wanna raise. So after my
questions, I'll give you an opportunity to make a statement if you wish, or
you know, provide information …
(Court underlining)
Member: OK. Is there anything that I have missed that you
want to tell me, that you think will help your case, or you think that may [sic]
I don’t understand.
Claimant: I just want to say that I cannot return because if
I do, they will kill me and I do not want to take that chance.
[10]
The Applicant made no other comment in respect
of the Member’s comments. The issue of his brothers’ successful refugee claims,
while raised as a fact in his narrative, is not again referred to by the Board.
[11]
The Applicant attests to his understanding of
the process, particularly that he could not make submissions or argument. He
was not cross-examined. I accept his evidence of his understanding as it is
consistent with the transcript, and with his reactions to the Member as well as
being unchallenged.
III.
Analysis
[12]
The sole issue which needs to govern this
judicial review is whether there has been a breach of procedural fairness. The
standard of review for this issue is correctness (Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339).
[13]
Self-represented litigants raise special
challenges to courts and tribunals, in part because of lack of familiarity with
the adjudicative process in this country. It is not the obligation of courts or
tribunals to provide mini courses on law and procedure but it is their
obligation to ensure that the legal process is fair. This was referred to by
Justice Barnes in Kamtasingh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2010 FC 45, 87 Imm LR (3d) 118, at para 10:
… In a situation involving an unrepresented
party, the scope of the duty of fairness is different and I subscribe to the
views expressed by my colleague, Justice Danièle Tremblay-Lamer in Law v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2007), 2007 FC 1006, 160
A.C.W.S. (3d) 879 at paras. 15-19:
15 Thus, the IAD is to be
shown much deference in its choice of procedure so long as that procedural
choice permits those who are affected by its decision to present their case.
16 Specifically, in the
context of the procedural rights afforded to a self represented party, this
Court has held that an administrative tribunal has no obligation to act as the
attorney for a claimant who refused counsel, and that:
[…] it is not the obligation of the
Board to “teach” the Applicant the law on a particular matter involving his or
her claim. (Ngyuen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FC 1001, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1244 (QL), at para. 17)
17 However, while administrative
tribunals are not required to act as counsel for unrepresented parties, they
must still ensure that a fair hearing takes place. In Nemeth v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 590, [2003] F.C.J. No. 776
(QL), at para. 13, O’Reilly J. asserted:
[…] But the Board’s freedom to
proceed in the absence of counsel obviously does not absolve it of the
over-arching obligation to ensure a fair hearing. Indeed, the Board’s
obligations in situations where claimants are without legal representation may
actually be more onerous because it cannot rely on counsel to protect their
interests.
18 It has also been recognized
that an unrepresented party “[…] is entitled to every possible and reasonable
leeway to present a case in its entirety and that strict and technical rules
should be relaxed for unrepresented litigants […]” (Soares v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 190, [2007] F.C.J. No. 254
(QL), at para. 22).
19 Therefore, it is evident
that the specific content of procedural rights afforded to unrepresented
parties is context-dependent. The paramount concern is ensuring a fair hearing
where the unrepresented party will have the opportunity to fully present their
case.
[14]
People who, for one reason or another, represent
themselves engage in a highly risk enterprise – the equivalent of doing open
heart surgery on oneself. There are limits on how far a court or tribunal can
go but it seems to me that the basic process – the hearing of evidence, the
sequence of evidence and cross-examination and the conduct and timing of argument
– are bare minimums, which must be explained.
[15]
In so saying, I am not in the least critical of
the Member. It is apparent that the Member attempted to explain the process in
simple terms and with simple words. However, in practical effect, the reference
to making “a statement” or providing “information” likely confused the
Applicant as to whether information/evidences were part of his “statement” or
whether there were two phases to the process – information/evidence taking as
distinct from argument. The second quote compounded the confusion.
[16]
Aside from the Applicant’s affidavit, his
reaction to the so-called invitation (or opportunity afforded) is consistent
with a lack of understanding of this process. He merely asked not to be sent
back and made no attempt to address the issues raised.
[17]
Most telling is the failure of the Applicant to
address the similar fact evidence of his brothers (who had been threatened by
investors just like the Applicant) and their successful refugee claims. The
Board’s own rules raise the importance of similar fact evidence.
21. (1) Subject
to subrule (5), the Division may disclose to a claimant personal and other
information that it wants to use from any other claim if the claims involve
similar questions of fact or if the information is otherwise relevant to the
determination of their claim.
|
21. (1) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (5), la Section peut communiquer au demandeur d’asile
des renseignements personnels et tout autre renseignement qu’elle veut
utiliser et qui proviennent de toute autre demande d’asile si la demande
d’asile soulève des questions de fait semblables à celles d’une autre demande
ou si ces renseignements sont par ailleurs utiles pour statuer sur la demande.
|
Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256
[18]
A breach of procedural fairness does not have to
arise through fault or blame of the decision maker. Unintended circumstances
may arise which create the unfairness and the unfairness is just as serious
whether intended or not. This process was undermined by unfairness and the
situation can be remedied by holding a new hearing.
IV.
Conclusion
[19]
Given that there was a breach of procedural
fairness, the decision will be quashed and the matter remitted back for a new determination.