Docket: IMM-5778-15
Citation:
2016 FC 642
Toronto, Ontario, June 8, 2016
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice McDonald
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BETWEEN:
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REEM NABHANI
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OSAMA SAAD
MAHFOUDH BAMASAOOD
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KOBALENTHIRA
KANAGASUNTHARAM
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MERVIN MAREKANI
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RACHELLE
NYAMOYA
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YOAN SAMUEL
NYAMOYA
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INGRID
NTAHIGIMA NZIKORUHIRO
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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ORDER AND REASONS
[1]
The seven Applicants have collectively applied
for leave and judicial review. They seek an order of mandamus requiring
the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
(the RPD or the Board) to hold a hearing in respect of their refugee claims
within 60 days of the Court’s Order. They also seek a declaration that section
159.9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2002-227 [Regulations], violates Canada’s international obligations and
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
[2]
By this Motion, the Respondent moves to set
aside the Applicants’ application for leave and judicial review on the basis
the application fails to comply with Rule 302 of the Federal Courts Rules,
SOR/98-106. The Respondent submits the Applicants should have filed single
applications for leave and judicial review.
[3]
Rule 302 states:
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302 Unless the Court orders
otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be limited to a single
order in respect of which relief is sought.
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302 Sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, la demande de contrôle
judiciaire ne peut porter que sur une seule ordonnance pour laquelle une
réparation est demandée.
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[4]
The Applicants argue that their collective
application raises a legal issue which is common to each claim, namely: whether
Canada is in breach of its international obligations by leaving their
Convention refugee status indeterminate, and whether the RPD is respecting the
purpose of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 by
failing to determine their status.
[5]
The facts and circumstances of the Applicants
must be considered in order to determine if the Court should exercise its
discretion to permit a common application and whether that is the most
appropriate manner by which to proceed.
[6]
Here the Applicants do not come from the same
country of origin and their circumstances are unique. Reem Nabhani is a
Palestinian born in Syria; Osama Saad Mahfoudh Bamasaood is a citizen of Yemen;
Kobalenthira Kanagasuntharam is a citizen of Sri Lanka; and Mervin Marekani,
Rachelle Nyamoya, Yoan Samuel Nyamoya, and Ingrid Ntahigima Nzikoruhiro are
from Burundi.
[7]
The Applicants’ refugee claims were made at
different times. The period of delay varies from six months to sixty-four
months.
[8]
The circumstances giving rise to the delay are
different. Reem Nabhani’s claim was sent back for redetermination to the RAD
following a successful judicial review, and the RAD subsequently referred the
matter back to the RPD. Osama Saad Mahfoudh Bamasaood and Mervin Marekani’s claims
were submitted before the coming into force of paragraph 159.9(b) of the
Regulations. Kobalenthira Kanagasuntharam’s hearing was postponed, by consent,
to allow the Canada Border Services Agency to submit further evidence. Rachelle
Nyamoya and Yoan Samuel Nyamoya’s claims were sent back to the RPD for
redetermination following a successful judicial review.
[9]
The order issued in Idris v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) (Unreported, May 18, 2016, Docket
IMM-664-16) [Idris] is relied upon by the Applicants. In Idris,
the applicants were all Eritrean refugee claimants whose claims for refugee
protection had been outstanding before the Board since 2012. Their claimed
relief arose from substantially the same facts and all of the applicants arrived
in Canada from Eritrea in 2012 and claimed refugee protection that same year.
Their claims to refugee protection had all remained outstanding for over three
years at the time of the order.
[10]
In my view, Idris is distinguishable as
the common elements in that case do not present themselves here. Here, the
Applicants are from different countries of origin, their refugee claims
originate at different times and in different circumstances, the period of the
delay varies from half a year to over five years, and the reasons for the delay
are distinct.
[11]
The situation here is more in keeping with that
in Kaur v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (Unreported,
September 27, 2006, Docket IMM-4404-06) [Kaur], where 38 applicants
sought a mandamus order in respect of 38 different applications for
temporary work permits. The Court in Kaur held that the interests of
justice and of judicial economy did not favour allowing the Applicants to seek
relief in a single application.
[12]
In this case, the justification for any mandamus
order would turn on the particular circumstances of each Applicant, including
the reasons for the delay and the extent of the delay. These circumstances
would have to be assessed individually, thereby likely creating complexity
rather than efficiency like in Kaur.
[13]
I agree with the Respondent that the Applicants’
entitlement to the relief sought depends on the unique facts of their
individual cases. In my view, the circumstances of the Applicants are not
sufficiently common to justify a single application for judicial review. I
would therefore allow the Respondent’s motion and set aside the application for
leave and for judicial review.