Docket: T-1831-24
Citation: 2025 FC 504
Ottawa, Ontario, March 18, 2025
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Manson
BETWEEN: |
COLLEGE OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP CONSULTANTS |
Applicant |
and |
PARVINDER SINGH SANDHU |
Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Introduction
[1] This is an application for an order under section 40 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7 (the “
Act”
), prohibiting the Respondent, Parvinder Singh Sandhu (“Mr. Sandhu”
), from instituting further proceedings, or from continuing proceedings previously instituted by him, in this Court except with leave.
[2] For the reasons that follow, the application is allowed.
II. Background
[3] The Applicant’s memorandum of fact and law sets out a thorough account of the facts relevant to this case. Rather than repeating it in its entirety, I provide a summary below.
A. The Parties
[4] The Applicant, the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants (the “College”
), is the regulatory body that oversees licensed immigration consultants in the public interest. The mandate of the College is to protect the public and maintain the integrity of Canada’s immigration system through effective regulation of immigration consultants. As part of this mandate, the College investigates complaints against licensed immigration consultants and takes disciplinary action against them where appropriate.
[5] The Respondent, Mr. Sandhu, and his brother, Devinder Singh Sandhu (the “Sandhus”
), were Regulated Canadian Immigration Consultants (“RCICs”
) licensed by the College, until their licenses were revoked by the College’s Discipline Committee on April 10, 2024. They are the directors and operating minds of a group of businesses, collectively called the Worldwide Immigration Consultancy Services Canada Inc. (“WWICS”
).
B. Disciplinary Proceedings before College’s Discipline Committee
[6] The Sandhus’ disciplinary proceedings before the College’s Discipline Committee related to 26 complaints that were filed against them (13 complaints each) from 2015 to 2022. The complaints allege, among other things, that the Sandhus submitted incomplete applications on behalf of clients, failed to provide clients with a receipt and/or statement of account, failed to respond to clients at all or in a timely manner, failed to register affiliated firms with the College, had clients sign multiple retainer agreements with WWICS-affiliated firms, and in some cases, asked clients to withdraw their complaints in exchange for a nominal refund.
[7] In August 2022, the complaints were consolidated to be heard together at a single hearing. In December 2022, the Sandhus filed a motion to exclude some of the College’s Witness Evidence Forms (“WEFs”
) from evidence (along with other relief) alleging that the signatures on these WEFs were not authentic. On February 1, 2023, the College Discipline Committee dismissed this motion, and directed the College to provide the Sandhus with copies of the emails received from its witnesses containing the WEFs.
[8] On February 22, 2023, the Sandhus filed a second motion to challenge the authenticity of the emails produced by the College on February 9, 2024, and to demand further disclosure. This was summarily dismissed by a Tribunal Chairperson.
[9] On March 17, 2023, the Sandhus filed another motion before the Discipline Committee for a stay of proceedings and other relief, repeating their earlier allegations respecting the authenticity of the signatures on the College’s WEFs (the “Stay Motion”
). On August 3, 2023, the Discipline Committee dismissed the Stay Motion, with costs payable to the College.
[10] On October 12, 2023, after written submissions on liability were already filed by the parties, Devinder Sandhu brought another motion to the Discipline Committee to “re-open”
the disciplinary proceedings against him on several grounds, including “fresh evidence”
regarding the authenticity of the signature of a College witness. On November 24, 2023, the Discipline Committee granted the College’s counter motion to summarily dismiss the motion, noting that it has no reasonable prospect of success as it was already decided.
[11] On November 24, 2023, the Discipline Committee found the Sandhus liable for professional misconduct by using unlicensed employees to provide immigration consulting services and encouraging clients to apply for immigration programs for which they were not qualified and otherwise providing inadequate services (the “Liability Decision”
).
[12] On April 10, 2024, after reviewing submissions from the College and Devinder Sandhu (the Respondent chose not to file any submissions), the Discipline Committee issued its penalty decision, immediately revoking the Sandhus’ licenses, finding that there was no other sanction that would “address the seriousness of their misconduct and its impact”
. The Committee further ordered that the Sandhus notify clients and post notices of their revocation on their websites and provide the College with a statutory declaration confirming the notice had been sent, as well as pay costs, fines, and refunds to complainants (“Penalty Decision”
).
[13] The Respondent has not complied with the Penalty Decision.
C. Judicial Reviews and Federal Court Actions
[14] Over the course of a two-year period, the Respondent has initiated, against the Applicant, three judicial reviews, two Federal Court actions, an appeal with the Federal Court of Appeal, and multiple motions.
[15] On March 13, 2023, the Sandhus separately filed nearly identical applications for judicial review of the Discipline Committee’s February 2, 2023 decision on the motion to exclude evidence (Court File No. T-455-23). On June 14, 2024, Associate Judge Horne granted the College’s motion to strike the application and struck the Sandhus’ applications as premature and an abuse of process as the discipline proceedings were still ongoing.
[16] On October 13, 2023, Mr. Sandhu filed an action against the College and its Discipline Committee to “dismiss”
the disciplinary proceedings, again while these proceedings were ongoing (Court File No. T-2162-23). In this claim, Mr. Sandhu asked this Court to launch an “investigation”
into the College and hold its personnel “accountable”
for its alleged “forgery”
and “tampering with evidence.”
The basis for his claim was the same as his grounds for judicial review - the alleged inauthenticity of the signatures of College witnesses and staff.
[17] Before pleadings closed, on November 1, 2023, Mr. Sandhu filed a motion for an “investigation”
into the “forgery of signatures”
of various College witnesses and staff, based on “shocking findings about the duplicitous and devious functionality and operations of the College.”
[18] On November 14, 2023, the College filed its motion record in response to the motion for an investigation, along with its motion to strike Mr. Sandhu’s claim.
[19] Before this Court had the opportunity to adjudicate Mr. Sandhu’s motion for an “investigation”
or the College’s motion to strike and without any direction from this Court to do so, on November 28, 2023, the Respondent filed another motion for production of “original”
signatures of College witnesses. The basis for this motion was again the alleged “forgery”
on “such an astronomical magnitude”
of signatures on behalf of the College. The Respondent discontinued this action before the within motions were heard.
[20] In response to a request from the College, on December 15, 2023, the Federal Court issued an order directing that Mr. Sandhu’s action continue as a specially managed proceeding and a case management judge be appointed.
[21] On December 27, 2023, Mr. Sandhu initiated a second judicial review application, seeking essentially the same relief as in the T-2162-23 action (Court File No. T-2749-23). The grounds for review repeated allegations of “tampering with evidence,”
“fraudulent documents,”
and “forgery of signatures,”
which Mr. Sandhu characterized as “criminal violations.”
Within this application, on January 5, 2024, Mr. Sandhu served the College with a motion for an “urgent injunction”
to “prevent”
the College’s Discipline Committee from “passing an order on Penalty.”
The Court dismissed this motion on February 22, 2024.
[22] In April 2024, Mr. Sandhu retained new counsel, who filed a notice of discontinuance of T-2162-23 and T-2749-23 on his behalf in May 2024 and subsequently withdrew from the record in June 2024.
[23] On April 30, 2024, the Sandhus filed another application for judicial review, judicially reviewing all the decisions by the College Discipline Committee in their disciplinary proceeding (Court File No. T-983-24). The application outlines every possible ground of judicial review (jurisdictional issues, procedural fairness, errors of law, errors of facts, fraud, etc.) without any particulars. The 850-page affidavit filed in support of this application included further unsupported allegations of forgery and criminal conduct on the part of the College.
[24] Within T-983-24, the Sandhus filed a motion to stay the Penalty Decision of the Discipline Committee. On May 9, 2024, the Court dismissed the Sandhus’ motion for a stay, finding that they had not established irreparable harm or the balance of convenience favours them. On July 21, 2024, on his own, Mr. Sandhu filed a motion to “set aside”
the order of Justice Gleeson of May 9, 2024 dismissing his stay motion, on the basis of alleged “forged signatures”
of the College’s affiants in the Federal Court matters. Justice Gleeson dismissed this on the grounds that it was barred by res judicata. The Respondent has appealed both these Court orders dismissing his stay to the Federal Court of Appeal (Court File No. A-322-24).
[25] On June 7, 2024, Mr. Sandhu filed a second action, against the College and its Discipline Committee for declarations that the College was engaged in widespread forgery and fraud and for $333 million in damages and $111 million in punitive damages, among other relief (Court File No. T-1428-24). The basis for his claim is again the alleged forgery of College signatures.
[26] Additionally, Mr. Sandhu has sent numerous letters to the Federal Court in relation to his files, alleging, among other things, that the College has misled the Court and engaged in fraud and deceit, and that the Attorney General and the College are working together to stop him from exposing the criminal violations being done at the College. Then, in August 2024, he filed an application against the Attorney General and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”
) for a writ of mandamus, requiring an investigation into his allegations of forgery and fraud against the College (Court File No. T-2003-24).
[27] On December 18, 2024, this Court ordered that the proceedings under Court File Nos. T-983-24 and T-1428-24 are held in abeyance pending the disposition of this application (Court File No. T-1831-24).
D. This Proceeding
[28] On July 25, 2024, the Respondent filed a motion to strike the application herein, alleging that the Consent of the Attorney General was “defunct”
because it was dated May 3, 2024, and was not based on the new proceedings he had initiated, under Court File Nos. T-983-24 and T-1428-24. The Court dismissed the motion on September 12, 2024.
[29] On August 28, 2024, the Court set out a timetable for the adjudication of this application, indicating that parties were to notify each other of whether they wished to cross-examine on affidavits by September 30, 2024 and that cross-examinations were to conclude by October 31, 2024.
[30] On September 29, 2024, Mr. Sandhu wrote stating that in addition to the College’s affiants, he sought to cross-examine four individuals who were not affiants, including three members of the Discipline Committee.
[31] On October 3, 2024, after direction from the Court, Mr. Sandhu wrote to the Court and College counsel, enclosing a motion to cross-examine the four individuals, and requesting the College’s position on his motion. On October 24, 2024, after back-and-forth letters from the parties to the Court regarding this motion, the Court ordered the cross-examinations to be completed by October 31, 2024.
[32] Mr. Sandhu cross-examined the College’s affiants on October 31, 2024.
[33] On November 12, 2024, Mr. Sandhu filed another motion to cross-examine the four individuals who are not College affiants. The Court dismissed this motion on December 17, 2024, on the basis that it was not necessary, as required under the test for determining whether to grant leave to issue a subpoena under Rule 41 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [Rules] (Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 128 at para 103).
[34] On December 24, 2024, the Respondent filed a motion for an Order for Reference pursuant to Rule 153(1) of the Rules. The Respondent requested the Court to clarify the questions of facts relating to the relevance, authenticity and admissibility of the evidence filed from both parties in this application. The Court dismissed this motion on January 22, 2025, asserting that the questions raised should be dealt with at the hearing of this application.
[35] On February 4, 2025, the Court dismissed a motion from the Respondent for the issuance of various subpoenas on the basis that the issues raised with respect to the requested subpoenas significantly overlap with the issues raised on the previous motions that the Court dismissed on December 17, 2024 and January 22, 2025, described above.
[36] On February 25, 2025, the Respondent filed another motion to the Court seeking various relief, including for an order compelling the disclosure of all records and communications relied upon by the Attorney General’s Office in issuing its consent in this application, an order quashing the consent of the Attorney General in this application, and an order holding the Department of Justice of Canada in contempt of court for “its persistent failure to comply with its statutory obligations under the
Privacy Act.”
[37] On March 11, 2025, the Court dismissed the motion on the basis that the motion materials did not comply with Rule 74(1) of the Rules and the requested relief is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or clearly unfounded; and/or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.
III. Issue
[38] The issue is whether an order for declaring the Respondent to be a vexatious litigant is warranted.
IV. Analysis
A. The Vexatious Litigant Test
[39] The relevant statutory provision for a declaration of vexatious litigant status is section 40 of the Federal Act, which reads as follows:
Vexatious proceedings
40 (1) If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court.
|
Poursuites vexatoires
40 (1) La Cour d’appel fédérale ou la Cour fédérale, selon le cas, peut, si elle est convaincue par suite d’une requête qu’une personne a de façon persistante introduit des instances vexatoires devant elle ou y a agi de façon vexatoire au cours d’une instance, lui interdire d’engager d’autres instances devant elle ou de continuer devant elle une instance déjà engagée, sauf avec son autorisation.
|
Attorney General of Canada
(2) An application under subsection (1) may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, who is entitled to be heard on the application and on any application made under subsection (3).
|
Procureur général du Canada
(2) La présentation de la requête visée au paragraphe (1) nécessite le consentement du procureur général du Canada, lequel a le droit d’être entendu à cette occasion de même que lors de toute contestation portant sur l’objet de la requête.
|
[40] In Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 [Olumide], Justice David Stratas set out the purposes underlying vexatious litigant legislation and the principles guiding the determination of whether a vexatious order is warranted (as supplemented by Simon v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 28 [Simon]).
[41] The threshold for declaring a litigant vexatious is governed by the underlying purposes of the declaration. Justice Stratas explains the purpose of vexatious litigant legislation as the following:
[17] Section 40 reflects the fact that the Federal Courts are community property that exists to serve everyone, not a private resource that can be commandeered in damaging ways to advance the interests of one.
[18] As community property, courts allow unrestricted access by default: anyone with standing can start a proceeding. But those who misuse unrestricted access in a damaging way must be restrained. In this way, courts are no different from other community properties like public parks, libraries, community halls and museums.
[19] The Federal Courts have finite resources that cannot be squandered. Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a moment unavailable to a deserving litigant. The unrestricted access to courts by those whose access should be restricted affects the access of others who need and deserve it. Inaction on the former damages the latter.
[20] This isn’t just a zero-sum game where a single vexatious litigant injures a single innocent litigant. A single vexatious litigant gobbles up scarce judicial and registry resources, injuring tens or more innocent litigants. The injury shows itself in many ways: to name a few, a reduced ability on the part of the registry to assist well-intentioned but needy self-represented litigants, a reduced ability of the court to manage proceedings needing management, and delays for all litigants in getting hearings, directions, orders, judgments and reasons.
[42] The overarching question before this Court is whether the litigant’s ungovernability or harmfulness to the court system and its participants justifies a leave-granting process for any new proceedings (Simon at para 18).
[43] The following non-binding indicia of vexatiousness aid the Court in determining whether to answer to this question in the affirmative (Olumide at paras 32-34; Simon at para 27):
instituting frivolous proceedings;
making scandalous or unsupported allegations against opposing parties;
re-litigating settled issues;
unsuccessfully appealing decisions
ignoring court orders, and rules;
refusing to pay outstanding cost awards; and
unfounded and intemperate allegations of bias, illegality, incapacity, and fraud against other parties, tribunals, or members of the Court and assertions and reassertions of these after they have been rejected (Canada (Attorney General) v Fabrikant, 2019 FCA 198 at para 26).
[44] Notably, a vexatious litigant order does not prohibit the litigant from accessing the Court. Their access is regulated: they must seek the Court’s leave before starting any proceeding (the Act, s 40(1)).
B. Application of the Vexatious Litigant Test
[45] As required by subsection 40(2) of the Act, this application is supported by the consent of the Attorney General’s delegate, the Assistant Deputy Attorney General (Coote v Lawyers' Professional Indemnity Company (Lawpro), 2014 FCA 98 at para 11).
[46] The Applicant asserts that the Respondent’s litigation strategy bears the indicia of a vexatious litigant. For support, they refer to the multiple proceedings in which the Respondent has relitigated the same issue - the bald allegation that the College and its affiliates have forged signatures; the scandalous and bare allegations against the College to this Court; and the many times where the Respondent has ignored the orders and Rules of this Court.
[47] I agree with the Applicant that an order declaring the Respondent a vexatious litigant is appropriate. Given the detailed summary of the facts above, I need not repeat them all in detail, as little needs to be said in order to support a finding of vexatiousness (Olumide at paras 39-40 citing Canada v Long Plain First Nation, 2015 FCA 177 at para 143).
[48] First, as undoubtedly clear from the summary of facts above, the Respondent has continuously sought to relitigate and seek investigation into his assertion that the College and its affiliates have forged signatures. He has done so before the Discipline Committee at least three times, before the Federal Court in at least six different actions, and before the Federal Court of Appeal. Again, on this application, the Respondent’s only submission is that in order for this application to have any merit, it needs to be established that his submissions made to the Federal Court and the College, regarding the criminal violations of the College, are false.
[49] These allegations were dealt with by the Discipline Committee, which dismissed the three motions where the Respondent raised arguments about the authenticity of the signatures of College witnesses in 2023. While these allegations may be relevant to an appropriate application for judicial review of the Discipline Committee’s decisions, the Respondent frivolously and continuously raises these allegations in proceedings and motions where it’s irrelevant to the issues at play. For example, in this proceeding alone, the Respondent has initiated three motions, in addition to his responding submissions, which relate to these allegations (motion to cross-examine the non-affiant witnesses, motion for a reference pursuant to Rule 153 of the Rules, and motion for various subpoenas). Contrary to the Respondent’s assertions, the merits of this application do not depend on the veracity of these allegations.
[50] Second, the Respondent’s continued and repeated allegations against the College regarding forgery, fraud, tampering with evidence, unethical practices, and “serious criminal violations”
, are scandalous, frivolous, and without adequate support (Wang v Canada, 2023 FC 1201 at para 6). As pointed out by the Applicant, these speculative allegations are damaging to not just the College and Discipline Committee, but to individual staff, adjudicators, and counsel. This Court cannot allow such widespread harmful and speculative assertions to continue unregulated.
[51] Lastly, as noted by the Applicant, the Respondent has ignored the orders and Rules of this Court, including by filing numerous lengthy letters with the Court, ignoring appeal deadlines, and ignoring the Court order that dismissed his judicial review of disciplinary proceedings because they were ongoing and then initiating subsequent motions and court actions relitigating the same issue.
[52] While the Respondent’s proceedings in this Court only began about two years ago, I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support an order declaring the Respondent a vexatious litigant. In doing so, I am guided by Justice Stratas’ warning against waiting too long to apply for relief under section 40 of the Act, stating that “too often”
applicants “do not start vexatious litigant applications for months, if not years”
and that “[i]n the meantime, much damage to many is done”
(Olumide at para 44).
[53] This is not the case of a needy, persistent self-represented litigant who is responsive to court assistance and guidance. The Respondent has demonstrated himself to be an ungovernable litigant: one that flouts court orders and persists in litigation doomed to fail—resurrecting it after it is struck, and then resurrecting it again and again (Simon at paras 13-16). There is no indication that the Respondent is open to or receptive of Court orders and guidance. To allow him to continue unregulated will only cause more damage to the Court system. The Respondent’s ungovernability and harmfulness towards the Court and the College justifies a leave-granting process for any new proceedings.
V. Conclusion
[54] The College’s application will be granted. Mr. Sandhu is declared a vexatious litigant and may not commence any proceedings in this Court without first obtaining leave to do so. Any proceedings now before this Court are stayed and may not be continued without leave.
[55] At the hearing, the College requested an order dismissing the actions filed under Court File Nos. T-983-24 and T-1428-24. This was the first time a request to dismiss T-983-24 was made in this application. The College’s Notice of Application and Memorandum of Fact and Law only request an order dismissing T-1428-24. The College’s reasoning for the delayed request was that at the time of filing its Notice of Application and Application Record, there was another applicant involved in T-983-24, Mr. Sandhu’s brother, and they did not want to affect his rights. Mr. Sandhu’s brother has since discontinued his participation in that file. Notwithstanding I have sympathy for the Applicant’s concerns about T-983-24 having little merit, without an explicit request in the notice of application, the request to dismiss T-983-24 is not before this Court, and cannot be granted (Pfizer Canada Inc v Teva Canada Limited, 2016 FCA 218 at para 22; the Rules, r 301(d)). Nonetheless, I agree with the College that T-1428-24 has no merit and should therefore be dismissed (Bernard v Canada (Professional Institute of the Public Service), 2019 FCA 236 at para 10).
[56] The College has submitted a bill of costs in support of this application which I find reasonable and well supported by the record and the Respondent’s conduct to date. Costs in the amount of $10,822.37 are hereby ordered and payable forthwith. In addition to the requirements of section 40(4) of the Act, no leave to commence any new proceedings will be granted until all outstanding costs awards against the Respondent are paid in full.
Email this Content